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THE CRIMINALIZATION OF
PERINATAL AIDS
TRANSMISSION
Heather Sprintzt
I. INTRODUCTION
THlE SPREAD of the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
has now reached epidemic proportions, sparing no gender, socio-
economic class, race, or sexual preference. 1 For those who have
been infected, education, prevention and treatment are three of the
many issues they must face while they struggle for life. Invariably,
another issue feeds on their anger and traditional notions of justice.
They ask of the public, the courts and themselves: who can I blame
for my death sentence? Who will be liable?
The initial response to the question of liability arose in the civil
sector.2 Lawsuit after lawsuit was decided; juries awarded astro-
nomical amounts to plaintiffs.' In the past few years, responding to
angry victims and to the failure of deterrence through civil suit, a
number of states have enacted criminal penalties for the knowing
transmission of the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV).4
t This note was written under the supervision of Professor Rebecca Dresser.
1. Sources of HIV infection in the cumulative total 33,245 cases of AIDS involving
adults and adolescents in the United States reported to the Centers for Disease Control
(CDC) as of April 6, 1987. As of April 1990, 136,204 AIDS cases have been reported. An
additional 100,000 people are presumed to have AIDS-related complex (ARC), a term used
to describe a condition that includes swollen glands, fever, weight loss, or a combination of
these symptoms. According to the CDC, an additional 1.5 million individuals are estimated
to be infected with the HIV but have no symptoms of disease. Although their blood contains
antibodies to the virus, they may have no other laboratory or clinical signs of disease. Au-
thorities estimate that 20 to 30 percent of those people will ultimately develop AIDS. Centers
for Disease Control, HIVIAIDS Surveillance, (June 1990).
2. See infra notes 21-41 and accompanying text.
3. One point six million dollars awarded for contracting AIDS, I 1 NAT'L L. J., Nov.
14, 1988, at 28 col. 2; Paul Marcotte, Record AIDS Verdict: Woman who received infected
blood wins $12 Million, 76 A.B.A. J. 26 (June 1990).
4. Mo. REv. STAT. § 191.677 (1991) (effective June 1, 1988); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
para. 12-16.2 (1989); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-123 (Michie 1989); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,
§ 1192.1(A) (West Supp. 1993).
As of October 14, 1991, the official Public Health Service count of AIDS-related criminal
cases in both civilian and military courts was more than 200. The total number of AIDS-
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These statutes generally focus on modes of transmission, such
as: intimate contact; donation or transfer of blood, or other bodily
fluids or tissue; and sharing of needles.5 Some outline affirmative
defenses to the transmission.6 One state does not even require ac-
tual HIV infection as a prerequisite to prosecution.7 Many of these
statutes are drafted broadly, without specifying particular acts to be
subject to criminal penalties. Furthermore, many fail to supply af-
firmative defenses, such as consent.8 However, they all have one
thing in common: they do not exclude from prosecution transmis-
sion through pregnancy. 9 Under these statutes, pregnant women
who transmit the virus to their children by transferring through the
placenta nourishment, hormones, blood, or any other bodily fluids,
can be prosecuted for felony punishable by years of imprisonment. 10
Part I of this note begins by discussing the existing law on the
prosecution of pregnant women for harm to their fetuses.11 This
section will discuss the creation of fetal civil rights against third
parties, and against parents. 12 It will also describe the various crim-
inal charges available to the state, on behalf of the child.13 Part II
discusses the criminal statutes which penalize infected individuals
for infecting, or creating the risk of infecting, other individuals. 4
This section will divide the relevant statutes into elements, and will
explain how a realistic application of these statutes includes the
prosecution of women who transmit the virus during pregnancy.' 5
Part III analyzes the constitutional arguments for and against pun-
related civil and criminal cases up to Sept. 1, 1991, was about 840, according to the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services. Rorie Sherman, Criminal Prosecutions on AIDS Grow-
ing, NAT'L. L. J., Oct. 14, 1991, at 1, 38.
5. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-16.2 (1989) (focusing on intimate contact,
donation or transfer of blood, and sharing of needles). Some other statutes are much broader.
See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1192.1(A) (West Supp. 1993) (making it a criminal offense
to "engage in conduct" which could result in the transmission). See also ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 5-14-123 (Michie 1989) (making it a criminal offense to "expose another person to... viral
infection... through the parenteral transfer of blood.").
6. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-16.2 (1989) (allowing informed consent to be
an affirmative defense).
7. Id. (sating that an infection does not have to occur in order for a person's conduct to
be criminal).
8. See infra note 5 and accompanying text.
9. Hereinafter referred to as "perinatal transmission."
10. For a detailed discussion of the statutes and their application to perinatal transmis-
sion, see infra § III(A) and accompanying notes.
11. See infra notes 21-47 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 25-41 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 48-70 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 71-89 and accompanying text.
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ishing perinatal transmission. 16 This section will outline the inter-
ests of the State, the child, and the woman, and will conclude that
punishing this type of transmission is unconstitutional.17 Part IV
considers relevant policy concerns such as the intrusion of these
laws upon all HIV-infected women and the disproportionate effect
the statutes have on poor minorities."8 In Part V, it is argued that
the resulting criminal penalty does not satisfy any one of the four
goals of criminal justice: reformation, deterrence, incapacita-
tion/isolation, nor retribution. 19 Given the ineffectiveness of these
statutes, a more humane and effective solution is posed to the in-
creasing number of pediatric AIDS cases in Part VI. It is suggested
that the statutes be redrafted to clearly define the terms "intimate"
and "sexual" contact, and to expressly exclude perinatal transmis-
sion. In addition, a proposal is made to increase access to education
for prospective mothers in hospitals, clinic prenatal care units,
schools and community shelters. It is also suggested that voluntary
HIV testing be offered to all women of childbearing age in conjunc-
tion with counseling and education. Finally, to care for the existing
pediatric and maternal patients and to prevent any rise in the statis-
tics, an increase in private, state and federal funding of prenatal care
clinics, drug rehabilitation programs serving pregnant and non-
pregnant women, and health care coverage is suggested.2'
II. EXISTING LAW ON THE LIABILITY OF PREGNANT
WOMEN FOR HARM TO THE FETUS
The history of liability for prenatal injury begins with Dietrich v.
Northampton.2 1 In 1884, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes denied a
cause of action in tort for prenatal injuries to a fetus, explaining that
any injury to the fetus was compensable through the mother's right
to recover damages.22 Dietrich aflirmed the notion that the fetus'
rights were integrated with the mother's rights, and that it therefore
had no independent legal rights against third parties.2" After Die-
16. See infra notes 90-167 and accompanying text.
17. See infra § IV.
18. See infra notes 168-203 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 204-16 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 217-24 and accompanying text.
21. 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
22. Id at 17. See also Stemmer v. Kline, 26 A.2d 489 (N.J. 1942) (dismissing a cause of
action for medical malpractice which adversely affected the fetus).
23. See Dietrich, supra note 21. See also Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 Ill. 359
(1900). The court there held that no action would lie for injuries to a fetus, only days away
from birth, due to the negligence of the defendant hospital where the mother of the plaintiff
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trich, and until 1937, all courts in the United States agreed that
there should be no cause of action for prenatal injury.2 4
When courts finally recognized a cause of action for prenatal
injury against third parties, the right to recover was contingent
upon the viability of the fetus at the time of the injury.25 In Illinois,
a cause of action was recognized under the wrongful death statute
for the death of a child who sustained a prenatal injury, while in a
viable condition, as a result of the negligence of a third party.26
This cause of action was later extended to cover prenatal injuries to
a viable fetus by a negligent third party which resulted in perma-
nent injury, short of death.27 Finally, a wrongful death action was
sustained against a negligent third party on behalf of a stillborn
child who was prenatally injured after the point of viability.2"
The courts abandoned the viability requirement as it proved to
be a difficult element to establish.29 A cause of action was extended
to a surviving infant for prenatal injuries that were inflicted during
a previable state of development by a third person. 0 Recovery has
even been permitted in the case of a hospital which negligently ad-
ministered a blood transfusion to a woman eight years prior to the
conception and bearing of a child injured as a result of the blood
transfusion.31
Until this point, the fetus or surviving infant could seek redress
was a patient awaiting the delivery of the plaintiff-fetus. The court stated that the plaintiff, at
the time of the injury, did not have a distinct and independent existence from his mother.
The injury was to the mother and not to the plaintiff.
24. Womack v. Buchhorn, 187 N.W.2d 218, 220-21 (Mich. 1971) (stating that "[w]hen
this Court decided Newman in 1937, there were ten jurisdictions other than Michigan deny-
ing recovery for prenatal injuries and three allowing it. Today 27 American jurisdictions
allow recovery. Federal District Courts have upheld recovery in two other jurisdictions and
there is favorable dictum by the state supreme court in still another jurisdiction. Only one
denies recovery.") (footnotes omitted). Id.
25. See Stallman v. Youngquist, 125 IM. 2d 267, at 273 (1988) The court stated that
"[t]he early reliance by courts on viability as a point at which with certainty it could be said
that the fetus and the woman who is the mother of the fetus are two separate entities proved
to be troublesome. Most courts have since abandoned viability as a requirement for a child to
bring an action for prenatal injuries inflicted by third persons." Id. at 273. See also 40
A.L.R.3d 1222 (1971).
26. Amann v. Faidy, 114 N.E.2d 412 (Ill. 1953).
27. Rodriguez v. Patti, 114 N.E.2d 721 (Ill. 1953).
28. Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 304 N.E.2d 88 (Ill. 1973).
29. 40 A.L.R.3d 1222 (1971). See also Stallman, 125 Ill. 2d at 273.
30. Sana v. Brown, 183 N.E.2d 187 (Ill. App. 1962); Daley v. Meier, 178 N.E. 2d 691
(Ill. App. 1961) and Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
31. Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 367 N.E.2d 1250 (Ill. 1977). But see Kozup v.
Georgetown Univ., 663 F. Supp. 1048, 1061 (D.D.C. 1987) (holding that the parents of an
infant who contracted AIDS as a result of blood transfusions given at birth could not main-
tain a cause of action against the hospital) modified, 851 F.2d 437 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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only from a third party. The doctrine of parental immunity pre-
cluded recovery against a parent for prenatal injury. 32 This had its
basis in the early common law cases refusing to legally separate the
fetus from its mother.33 However, this doctrine was partially abro-
gated in Grodin v. Grodin.34 There, the court held that a child may
maintain a lawsuit against his mother, alleging ordinary negligence
which resulted in brown and discolored teeth. 35  Grodin and other
similar cases set the precedent for the current state of the law al-
lowing tort actions against parents for prenatal injury.
The potential arsenal against a child's parents includes actions
for wrongful death,36 wrongful birth/wrongfu life,37 diminished
32. Grodin v. Grodin, 301 N.W.2d 869 (Mich. App. 1980) (reversing the trial court's
grant of summary judgment to defendant mother, and remanding for trial the issue of the
reasonableness of the mother's conduct). See also Plumley v. Klein, 199 N.W.2d 169 (Mich.
1972) (generally abolishing the common law rule that children cannot bring a cause of action
in tort against their parents while maintaining two limited exceptions). If a parent is afforded
the full protection of parent-child tort immunity, there would be no cause of action in any
circumstance for any injury a child sustains as a result of a parent's intentional, reckless, or
negligent conduct. However, some courts have generally abrogated this doctrine, creating a
cause of action, while allowing exceptions. The Grodin court acknowledged two exceptions
of the Plumley court. "(1) where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of reasonable
parental authority over the child; and (2) where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise
of reasonable parental discretion with respect to the provision of food, clothing, housing,
medical and dental services and other care." Grodin, 301 N.W.2d at 870, citing Plumley v.
Klein, 199 N.W.2d 169 (Mich. 1972). The policy underlying these exceptions was explained
by the Wisconsin Supreme Court as follows, "within the framework of parental authority and
discretion, parents must be accorded immunity from litigation which in fact would disrupt
family harmony and unity. The immunity is limited to transactions which are essentially
parental." Lemmen v. Servais, 158 N.W.2d 341, 344 (Wis. 1968).
33. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text. See also Mayberry v. Pryor, 352
N.W.2d 322 (Mich. App. 1984) (commenting that Grodin was "incorrectly decided"), rev'd,
374 N.W.2d 683 (Mich. 1985).
34. 301 N.W.2d 869 (Mich. App. 1980). See also Smith v. Brennan, 157 A.2d 497 (N.J.
1960).
35. Grodin, 301 N.W.2d at 869 (alleging that the mother was negligent in her failure to
seek proper prenatal care by failing to request a pregnancy test after noticing clear signs of
pregnancy, and failing to inform her doctor that she was taking tetracycline after she retained
the physician's services in her seventh month of pregnancy).
36. A recovery for wrongful death lies in the argument that but for the defendant's
prenatal negligence, the child would have been born healthy. Applying this reasoning to the
duty owed to the child by its mother, the mother who chooses not to abort has the same duty
as an outsider to avoid prenatal actions injurious to a child who would otherwise be born
healthy.
The majority of jurisdictions allow recovery under wrongful death statutes for a post-
viability stillbirth. John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception,
Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 69 Va. L. Rev. 405, 440 (1983) [hereinafter Procreative Liberty].
At least one court has allowed wrongful death recovery where the prenatal conduct caused
the fetus' death before viability. Valence v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 50 So. 2d 847 (La.
Ct. App. 1951) (mother was two to four months pregnant at time of defendant's negligence).
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life, 3 8 negligence, 39 and intentional tort.'0  The apparent advantages
See also W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS § 55, at 369-70 (5th ed. 1984).
37. This doctrine advocates that individual parents have the obligation to protect their
child/fetus from every possible risk of harm, and therefore the child has the corresponding
right "to begin life with a sound mind and body." Womack v. Buckhorn, 187 N.W.2d at 222.
According to this theory, a parent wrongs a child if she chooses "to conceive in the face of a
substantial risk of transmitting genetic or infectious diseases. Thus, if the child is likely to be
born with a serious illness or disability, the parents are obligated to avoid childbearing alto-
gether." Kathleen Nolan, Protecting Fetuses from Prenatal Hazards: Whose Crimes? What
Punishment?, 9 CRim. JUST. ETHics 13, 17 (1990) (hereinafter Protecting Fetuses).
The child's burden of proof lies in establishing that his parents knew that the child was a
foreseeable victim of disease or disability if they conceived or continued a pregnancy, and that
irrespective of this information, the parents chose to give birth. He can establish his claim by
proving that "it would be rational for.., a representative of his or her "best interests" to
prefer nonexistence to the child's ever having been born. In other words, a "reasonable per-
son" concerned about the child's welfare would conclude that, if all of his or her important
interests are doomed from the very start, it would be irrational to prefer the birth of such a
child to nonexistence." John D. Arras, AIDS and Reproductive Decisions: Having Children
in Fear and Trembling, 68 MILBANK Q. 353 (1990) [hereinafter Fear and Trembling].
In applying this theory of relief to the context of perinatal AIDS transmission, "[b]y far
the most powerful argument... would be that such a choice [to have children] places future
offspring at unacceptable risk of catastrophic harm... [This harm would be] so great that no
one would want to live such a life." However, it is very difficult to argue that all (or at least
the vast majority) of infected children will have lives so brief and so filled with suffering that
they qualify as "wrongful." !d, at 364-65. Since only a small percentage of those born HIV
infected fit the worst case scenario, and two-thirds of the children born to HIV infected
mothers will not even contract the virus, a claim of wrongful life will be very hard to sustain
given these optimistic statistics which refute foreseeability.
See, eg., Womack v. Buckhorn, 187 N.W.2d 218 (holding that a child may sue for negli-
gently inflicted prenatal injuries sustained in an automobile accident); Curlender v. Bio-Sci-
ence Laboratories, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980) (holding the "wrongful-
life" cause of action to be "the right of... [a] defective child to recover damages for the pain
and suffering to be endured during the limited life span available to such a child [.] ... any
special pecuniary loss resulting from the impaired condition and possibly even punitive dam-
ages"). For a general discussion of the wrongful birth theory, see Lynn D. Fleischer, Wrong-
ful Births: When Is There Liability for Prenatal Injury? 141 AM. 3. DISEASES CHILDREN 1260
(1987).
38. Advocates of this theory concede "the low risk of wrongful life, but insist that the
overall harm/probability ratio remains grim for HIV-infected children, [given the statistics]
.... Even though many of these children will have lives that are 'minimally decent' or
'worth living,' the decision to have them might still be faulted under certain circumstances."
Arras, supra note 37, at 366-67. These children did not have any alternative "to either nonex-
istence or this particular 'minimally decent' life," and the decision of its parents to carry the
pregnancy to term thereby exposing them to a high risk of great suffering was irresponsible
and wrong. Id See also Sam S. Balisy, Maternal Substance Abuse" The Need to Provide
Legal Protection for the Fetus, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1209 (1987). This author advocates creat-
ing a cause of action to recover the value of the lost quality of life against both parents of
substance-abused infants.
39. See supra notes 25-35 and accompanying text.
40. As heinous as it may seem, there are rare but troubling cases of intentional infliction
of prenatal injury. See John T. Condon, The Spectrum of Fetal Abuse in Pregnant Women,
174 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 509 (1986).
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of chipping away at the parental immunity doctrine, such as com-
pensating a child for prenatal injuries sustained due to his mother's
drug addiction or his father's battery, are offset by a host of negative
ramifications.4 This newly created cause of action imposes an end-
less list of duties upon a pregnant woman that transforms her from
an autonomous woman to the guarantor of the mind and body of
her child. Failure of any one of her responsibilities may result in
infinite liability. The legal separation of the mother's rights from
the child's rights, coupled with the institution of legal remedies for
parental misconduct, has effectively resulted in the distortion of the
mother-child relationship. Mother and child have become legal ad-
versaries from the moment of conception until birth.
Until now, this note has only discussed the history of parental
tort liability. Many states are considering enacting criminal statutes
penalizing women for harm to their fetuses, in addition to recogniz-
ing a civil cause of action.42 Many courts have held that a viable
fetus is a person for purposes of protection under the State's vehicu-
lar homicide statute.43 A newly created class of felons have been
targeted under child abuse, drug trafficking and manslaughter stat-
utes for perinatal delivery of drugs.' One innovative state has even
41. For a discussion of the constitutional and policy-based arguments against perinatal
transmission, see infra § IV and § V.
42. Recently in Ohio, the Supreme Court held that a parent may not be prosecuted for
child endangerment for substance abuse occurring before the birth of the child under a stat-
ute which provided that "No person, who is the parent ... of a child under eighteen years of
age... shall create a substantial risk to the health or safety of the child, by violating a duty of
care, protection, or support." State v. Gray, 584 N.E.2d 710, 711 (Ohio 1992) (quoting Ohio
R.C. § 2919.22(A)). However, the court stated that, "[t]he legislature is an appropriate fo-
rum to discuss public policy, as well as the complexity of prenatal drug use, its effect upon an
infant, and its criminalization.... [t]he Ohio Legislature currently has before it S.B. No. 82,
which, if passed, would create the new crime of prenatal child neglect to handle situations
such as those at bar. 'A court should not place a tenuous construction on [a] statute to
address a problem to which the legislative attention is readily directed and which it can read-
ily resolve if in its judgment it is an appropriate subject of legislation.'" Id.
43. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cass, 467 N.E.2d 1324 (Mass. 1984). In struggling with
the concept of personhood, the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the conviction of a man for
reckless homicide where the defendant hit a pregnant woman in a car accident. An emer-
gency delivery was then performed. After only a few heartbeats, the baby died. The court
found that the child was born alive and was therefore a person for purposes of the criminal
statutes. Id See also People v. Bolar, 440 N.E.2d 639 (Ill. 1982) (holding that the fetus was a
person for the purpose of applying a reckless homicide statute).
44. Case law has been inconsistent on the subject. In People v. Melanie Green, Melanie
Green's child was born cocaine addicted, and died two days later. A complaint was filed
against Melanie Green for involuntary manslaughter and delivery of a controlled substance.
The Grand jury refused to indict her. Tom Hundley, Infant A Growing Casualty of the
Drug Epidemic, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 16, 1989, at 1. However, in People v. Jennifer Clarise John-
son, the baby was born addicted to cocaine and survived. Ms. Johnson was prosecuted, and
HEALTH MATRIX
attempted to draft a statute which narrowly applies to pregnant
drug-users.45 In fact, the prosecutors of one case admitted that the
defendant's "non-criminal behaviors were the basis for the prosecu-
tion because drugs had little if anything to do with the baby's inju-
ries."' 4' However, prosecuting mothers for harm to their fetuses is
by no means limited to illegal drug use. Mothers may be prosecuted
for child abuse if they drink (not necessarily "abuse") alcohol while
pregnant, or even if they fail to follow medical advice. Failing to
seek prenatal care, smoking, eating non-nutritious foods, and taking
over-the-counter medications could also be covered under fetal en-
dangerment statutes.47
III. CRIMINAL PENALTY FOR THE PERINATAL
TRANSMISSION OF THE HIV VIRUS
The historical and legal progression of fetal rights has developed
at the close of her bench trial she was found guilty of delivery of a controlled substance to a
minor. The judge found that delivery of the drug occurred through the umbilical cord afler
the birth of the child and before the cord was severed. No. 89-1765 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App., 5th
Dist., 1989) (decision quashed, question answered, and case remanded). See also State v.
Gray, supra note 42, where the Ohio Supreme Court held that a woman could not be prose-
cuted for delivery of drugs to her unborn child under a child endangerment statute.
45. Legislation before the Illinois legislature is House Bill 2835 which represents the first
attempt to specifically address the prosecution of drug-abusing pregnant women. The act
would establish a new criminal statute which provides that any woman who is pregnant and
without a prescription knowingly or intentionally uses a dangerous drug or narcotic, and her
child is born addicted or the drug is detected as present in the child's blood or urine, commits
an offense entitled "Conduct Injurious to a Newborn." HB 2835, 86th General Assembly,
State of Illinois (1989 and 1990) amending ch. 38, new § 12-4.7.
46. Jim Schacter, Help Is Hard to Find for Addict Mothers, L.A. TiMs, Dec. 12, 1986,
§ 2 at 1.
47. In re J. Jeffirey, No. 99851 (Mich. Ct. App. filed Apr. 9, 1987); Baby Placed in Foster
Home Doctor Claims Prenatal Abuse, DEs Mois REG., Apr. 3, 1980, at I lA; Reyes v.
Superior Court, 141 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1977). See Robertson, supra note 36.
There is no question that a state could prohibit actions by a pregnant woman that
might reasonably be thought to kill a viable fetus in utero or cause it to be born in a
damaged state. Laws that prohibited pregnant women from obtaining or using al-
cohol, tobacco, or drugs likely to damage the fetus would be constitutional, even if
these laws applied only to pregnant women .... A statute forbidding pregnant
women the use of alcohol or tobacco in order to minimize risks to their fetuses
would pass the courts' 'rational basis' test.
Similarly, states could amend or interpret child abuse, feticide, or abortion laws
to include a wide range of behavior by pregnant women that is likely to cause harm
to their unborn children. Under such statutes, it would be possible to punish a
woman who refused to take a necessary medication or who knowingly exposed her-
self to teratogenic substances or environments."
Id at 442-43. See also Developments - Medical Technology and the Law, 103 HARV. L. REV.
1519, 1564 (1990) [hereinafter Med Tech] ("Attempts by states to intervene in pregnancy
could involve 'enormous intrusions' into the woman's privacy, including regulation of her
eating, drinking, smoking, or sexual habits.").
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from mere co-existence with maternal rights, to the existence of fe-
tal rights wholly independent from those of the mother.48 As dis-
cussed above, the unborn child has the right to redress in the civil
and criminal arenas, consistent with the concept that it has the right
to be free from harm imposed by either third parties or its parents.4 9
Recently, a new criminal cause of action has been established
against any individual who has exposed others to the HIV virus."
Since unborn children have been granted rights equal, if not supe-
rior, to those of infants and adults," l pregnant women have been
subject to an increasing variety of claims of prenatal injury by, and
on behalf of, their children,52 and the perinatal transmission of
AIDS satisfies the elements of the new HIV-specific statutes, 53 a
new cause of action has been inadvertently 4 added to a child's
stockpile against its mother. The State can effectively prosecute a
mother for perinatally transmitting the HIV virus to her unborn
child.
48. See § IV(8)(A), n. 152-54 and accompanying text. See also § II, n. 33-42 and ac-
companying text and accompanying notes. At the time this note was written, Roe v. Wade
had not yet been overturned or partially abandoned. However, the Supreme Court of the
United States had recently accepted a Pennsylvania case on writ of certiorari which reasserts
the issue of the legality of abortion. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 60 USW 4795 (1992).
In the abortion context, the state has a compelling interest in protecting the life of a fetus
after the point of viability has been proven by tests that are medically prudent and useful.
Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 192 U.S. 490 (1989) (plurality opinion). Therefore,
with regard to abortion, a fetus earns rights separate from its mother after viability, even
though with regard to prenatal injury or fetal endangerment, the issue of viability has been
abandoned. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
49. See supra § II and accompanying notes.
50. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-14-123 (1989); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-16.2
(1989); Mo. REv. STAT. § 191.677 (1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 21, § 1192.1(A) (West
Supp. 1993).
51. See infra § IV(8)(A), n. 152-54 and accompanying text. See also § II, n. 33-42 and
accompanying text and accompanying notes (implying that the child's right to be born with a
sound mind and body, free from harm inflicted by its parents, is superior to the right to
privacy and bodily autonomy which all other individuals except pregnant women are
afforded).
52. Id.
53. See infra § III and accompanying notes.
54. Scott H. Isaacman, Are We Outlawing Motherhood for HIV-Infected Women? 22
Loy. U. Cm. L.J. 479,485 n.43 (1991) (Through his own research, Isaacman discovered that
with regard to the Illinois statute, "[t]he bill's sponsor in the Illinois House, State Representa-
tive Penny Pullen, takes complete credit for its drafting and states that the intended purpose
was to respond to HIV-infected prostitutes who continue to work .... A review of the bill's
legislative history reveals no input from health professionals, and the comments fail to ad-
dress perinatal transmission.... A representative of the Illinois State Medical Society con-
firmed that his organization was never consulted by the legislature and did not participate in
drafting the bill ... Similarly, the Illinois Department of Public Health and Illinois Hospital
Association were not consulted and did not participate in the bill's formulation .. ")
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A. History of Liability for Transmitting the HIV Virus
There are two general categories of legal remedies for an indi-
vidual who has contracted the HIV virus-civil liability and crimi-
nal liability. Civil liability is the primary monetary remedy for the
individual.5 5 Criminal liability is action by the State in the interest
of the individual and the public health. 6
There are at least twenty-four states that have enacted criminal
statutes to deal with the problem of an individual who knowingly
creates the risk of transmitting the HIV virus.57 For example, Illi-
nois makes it unlawful to knowingly58 engage in intimate contact;
transfer, donate or provide blood, tissue, semen, organs, or other
potentially infectious body fluids for transfusion, transplantation,
insemination or other administration to another; or dispense, de-
55. This note will not fully analyze the available civil remedies. However, as a brief
overview, there are four causes of action one can pursue in the civil arena. Battery, the first
common law cause of action, has been a very successful claim. Battery is the intentional,
harmful or offensive, and unprivileged contact with the person of another. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 13, 18 (1965). Negligence, the second cause of action, is defined as
conduct that falls below the standard established by law for the protection of others against
the unreasonable risk of harm. Id See Crowell v. Crowell, 105 S.E. 206, 208 (N.C. 1920) (It
is a well-settled proposition of law that "a person is liable if he negligently exposes another to
a contagious or infectious [venereal] disease."). See also Duke v. Houser, 589 P.2d 334, 340
(Wyo. 1979) (where the court held that "[o]ne who negligently exposes another to an infec-
tious or contagious disease, which such other person thereby contracts, can be held liable in
damages for his actions.") Fraud or Deceit is the third cause of action. Its elements include
1) a false representation by the defendant 2) the defendant's knowledge or belief of the falsity
of the representation or the absence of any reasonable basis for the defendant to believe in its
truth 3) the defendant's intention to induce the plaintiff to act in reliance on the misrepresen-
tation 4) the plaintiff's justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation and 5) damage to the
plaintiff resulting from the reliance. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13, 18
(1965). This cause of action is a less sound basis for liability than battery or negligence. Third
Party Actions are the final category of civil suit. A third party action is a negligence action
brought by the plaintiff against the defendant for infecting X who then infected plaintiff. See
Jaffee v. Dills, No. 84 CI - 02139 (Ky. Cir. Ct. 1984) (as discussed in Jonathon Dalton, The
Consequences of an Uninformed Menage a Trois Extraordinaire: Liability to Third Parties for
the Nondisclosure of Genital Herpes Between Sexual Partners, 29 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 787, 802-
03, 807-08, (1985)). This type of civil action may feasibly be brought on behalf of a child
against the person who infected the child's mother.
56. See infra § IV(A).
57. Rorie Sherman, Criminal Prosecutions on AIDS Growing, NAT'L. L. J., Oct. 14,
1991, at 38 ("24 states have passed AIDS-related criminal laws since 1987").
58. See Molly McNulty, Pregnancy Police. The Health Policy and Legal Implications of
Punishing Pregnant Women for Harm to Their Fetuses, 16 REv. OF LAW & Soc. CHANGE
277 (1987) ("A criminal statute designed to punish reckless or negligent behavior creating a
substantial risk of harm to the fetus (an objective standard of care) effectively would result in
a strict liability crime that would disregard a woman's economic situation, person values, and
individual health needs... a narrower statute targeting intentional or knowing imposition of
harm (a subjective standard of care) might avoid the problems inherent in an objective stan-
dard .... "). Id. at 318.
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liver, exchange, sell or in any other way transfer to another any
nonsterile intravenous or intramuscular drug paraphernalia. 9 Ar-
kansas has enacted a broad yet cursory statute which makes it a
criminal offense to "expos[e] another to HIV if the person knows he
or she has tested positive for HIV and exposes another person to
such viral infection through the parenteral transfer of blood .... "'
Oklahoma has done the same by making it "unlawful for any per-
son knowing that he or she has [AIDS] or is a carrier of [HIV] and
with intent to infect another, to engage in conduct reasonably likely
to transfer ... blood [or] bodily fluids .... 1
In a separate clause, the Illinois statute defines "HIV" and "in-
timate contact." "HIV" includes the full-blown symptomatic case,
as well as HIV-positive (seropositive) or any other agent of HIV.62
This implies that a person who has recently tested HIV-positive, but
currently has no symptoms and may not have any symptoms of
AIDS for five to ten years, may still be considered a culpable indi-
vidual under this statute.63 "Intimate contact" is defined as expo-
sure of the body of one person to a bodily fluid of another person in
a manner which could result in the transmission of HIV.6 This
implies that any kind of contact which could pose a risk of trans-
mitting the virus can satisfy the "act" required to invoke the pen-
alty. This contact could include spitting,65 sweating,66 bleeding, 67
kissing,6" or perinatal contact since all of these actions involve, or
59. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-16.2 (1989).
60. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-14-123 (1989). The term "parenteral" refers to any transfer
that is not through the mouth, or the gastrointestinal tract. This includes the perinatal trans-
fer of blood.
61. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1192.1(A) (West Supp. 1993).
62. ILL REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-16.2 (1989).
63. Id (expressly stating that " 'HIV' means the human immunodeflciency virus or any
other identified causative agent of acquired immunodeficiency syndrome.")
64. Id
65. State v. Haines, 545 N.E.2d 834, 838 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (reinstating conviction of
attempted murder supported by evidence that the defendant carried the AIDS virus, was
aware of his infection, believed it to be fatal, and intended to inflict others with the disease by
spitting, biting, scratching and throwing blood).
66. Magic Johnson's recent discovery and announcement that he tested positive for the
AIDS antibody sparked a nation-wide discussion on the possibility of transmitting the virus
through his sweat on the basketball court.
67. See Haines, 545 N.E.2d at 838 (mere bleeding of an AIDS-infected patient is not
sufficient to trigger an attempted murder charge, in Haines the defendant was "throwing
blood," apparently taking substantial steps to infect others).
68. There has been some discussion and research to determine whether the virus can be
found in saliva, since it is a body fluid. The conclusion can only be determined by finding out
whether the saliva contains T-cells, which are susceptible to the virus.
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could involve, the intermingling of bodily fluid, conceivably creat-
ing a risk of transmission.
It must be noted that at least two states, Illinois and Missouri,
penalize the individual for merely creating the risk of transmis-
sion.69 They require knowledge of infection, but specify that an in-
dividual may be prosecuted under the statute even if HIV infection
does not result from the exposure.7"
B. How These Statutes can be Applied to Pregnant Women who
Transmit the Virus to Their Fetuses
The language of these statutes makes it possible to prosecute a
woman for transmitting the virus to her unborn fetus through the
placenta and umbilical cord during pregnancy, or even during the
sixty to ninety seconds after birth before the umbilical cord is cut.7
The woman satisfies the first element of the offense if she discovers
that she is HIV positive prior to or during pregnancy.72
In Illinois, the requisite "act" that creates the risk of transmis-
sion could be either "engaging in intimate contact with another," or
69. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-16.2 (1989) (stating that intimate contact is the
exposure of the body of one person to a bodily fluid of another in a manner which could
result in the transmission of HIV); see also Mo. STAT. ANN. § 191.677 (1991) (making it
"unlawful for any individual knowingly infected with HIV to... [d]eliberately create a grave
and unjustifiable risk of infecting another with HIV... when an individual knows that he is
creating that risk").
The Illinois and Missouri legislatures have taken on the burden of determining the level of
risk to which an HIV infected individual may justifiably expose other persons. One must
keep in mind that a level of risk that some find prohibitive might be quite tolerable to others.
In the case of HIV infected women, the inquiry is even more complex, when legislatures
attempt to weigh the justifiability of having children. In general, the greater the magnitude
and probability of predicted harm, the less justifiable it is to have children. Applying this
formula has effectively been avoided in Illinois by criminalizing any risk of transmission. In
Missouri, the legislature decided on a "grave and unjustifiable" standard. However, it re-
mains to be seen whether the Missouri courts will construe this term narrowly or broadly.
70. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-16.2 (1989) (proposing that an infection does not
have to occur for the above conduct to be criminal); see also Mo. STAT. ANN. § 191.677
(1991) (where there is no discussion of an actual transmission or infection; only the risk of
transmission is clearly delineated).
71. See Johnson v. State, 602 So.2d 1288 (Fla. 1992). (Johnson had been convicted and
sentenced to 15 years on probation, and required to abstain from drug and alcohol use if
pregnant and to comply with prenatal care recommendations after she "delivered illegal
drugs" to a minor via the umbilical cord in the moment after her child was born and before
the cord was clamped). Id. at 1290-91. The Florida Supreme Court reversed this conviction,
stating that the statute "does not encompass 'delivery' of an illegal drug derivative from
womb to placenta to umbilical cord to newborn after a child's birth. If that is the intent of
the legislature, then this statute should be redrafted to clearly address this problem of passing
illegal substances from mother to child in utero, not just in the birthing process." Id. at 1296.
72. Scott H. Isaacman, Are We Outlawing Motherhood for HIV-Infected Women? 22
LOYOLA U. L. J. 479, 485 (1991).
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transferring, donating or providing blood, tissue, semen, organs, or
other potentially infectious body fluids for transfusion, transplanta-
tion, insemination, or other administration. ' 7 3 In Missouri, the
requisite act is merely "deliberately creating a grave and unjustifi-
able risk of infecting another with HIV through sexual or other con-
tact."'74 Oklahoma and Arkansas contain similar language to
Missouri's statute.75 A pregnant woman infected with HIV would
satisfy any one of these exculpatory clauses.
In Illinois, "sexual conduct" is defined in a preceding Code sec-
tion as "any intentional or knowing touching or fondling by the
victim or the accused, either directly or through clothing, of the sex
organs, anus or breast of the victim or the accused, or any part of
the body of a child under 13 years of age, for the purpose of sexual
gratification or arousal of the victim or the accused." 76 In drafting
the HIV statute, the legislature expressly used the term "intimate
contact," not "sexual contact." Since they defined sexual contact in
the preceding section, intimate contact must have a different mean-
ing.7 7 "Intimate contact" must implicitly include sexual and non-
sexual contact.7" Transplacental contact is non-sexual contact
which exposes "the body of one person to a bodily fluid of another
person in a manner that could result in the transmission of HIV."7 9
Under any of the above mentioned statutes, transplacental exposure
to HIV would be is considered criminal conduct.
Tying both elements together, under these statutes a woman
would be guilty of creating a grave and unjustifiable risk of infecting
her fetus with HIV through placental blood transfer," if she knew
that she was infected with the virus prior to or during pregnancy."
A "plain meaning" analysis of the statute points to the conclu-
73. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-16.2 (1989).
74. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 191.677(2) (Vernon 1990) (emphasis added).
75. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
76. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-12(e) (1984).
77. Id.
78. See ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 38, para. 12-16.2(b) (1989) (defining "'[i]ntimate contact
with another' [as] ... the exposure of the body of one person to a bodily fluid of another in a
manner that could result in the transmission of HIV.")
79. Id.
80. However, in actuality, there is only a 20-30% chance that a woman who is HIV
positive will give birth to a child that is HIV positive. Carol Levine & Nancy N. Dubler,
Uncertain Risks and Bitter Realities: The Reproductive Choices of HIV-infected Women, 68
MILBANK Q. 321, 327 (1990) [hereinafter Reproductive Choices].
81. It is the act of getting pregnant when the woman knowingly is infected, or even
intentionally getting pregnant, that satisfies culpability. The consequences are irrelevant in
these statutes - the focus is on the knowledge that an individual is creating the risk of
transmission.
HEALTH MATRIX
sion that a woman who is HIV positive, and who transfers the virus
to her unborn fetus, may be charged with a felony upon the birth of
the child. Looking beyond the four corners of the statute, it can
also be argued that since no specific exception for perinatal trans-
mission was included, the legislature must have contemplated this
extension of liability and its silence constitutes implicit approval of
this liability.
Advocates of prosecution may also argue that the policy ration-
ale behind the statute encourages liability in these cases. The stat-
ute was enacted to curb the growing spread of AIDS through
specific and general deterrence.8 2 By allowing women to escape lia-
bility when they infect their children, there would be no incentive
for these women not to add to the growing population of AIDS
victims.8 3 By creating another person with the HIV virus, it is as if
they have added another number to the statistics.84
Given the facts that fetal infection satisfies the broad language of
the statute,85 that there is no exception for fetal infection,86 that the
infection rate has risen to epidemic proportions,8 7 that the fetus has
rights separate and independent from the mother,88 and that the
State has an increasing interest in protecting the fetus,89 it is clear
that childbearing could become a felony under these statutes.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS FOR AND
AGAINST PUNISHING PERINATAL AIDS
TRANSMISSION
There are many different reasons for a legislature to enact crimi-
nal statutes limiting individual freedom. Some are designed for or-
82. See Isaacman, supra note 72, at 485, n. 43 (through his own correspondence, the
author claims that the sponsor of the Illinois bill stated that the intended purpose was to
respond to HIV-infected prostitutes who continue to work).
83. Although in the realm of drug-abuse, even with the growing number of cases which
prosecute and convict mothers for delivering drugs to a minor through the umbilical cord,
the number of babies born addicted has not decreased, nor has the incidence of use of women
within childbearing age decreased.
84. Federal and state health officials who counsel HIV infected women to forego
childbearing "tend to view the problem in terms of the overallpublic objective of reducing the
spread of a lethal virus to the offspring of HIV-infected women." Arras, supra note 37, at
353. See also Levine & Dubler, supra note 80, at 323.
85. See supra notes 71-84 and accompanying text.
86. See text supra in this section.
87. Mary E. Guinan & Ann Hardy, Epidemiology of AIDS in Women in the United
States, 257 JAMA 2039-42 (1987). The number of cases reported to the Centers for Disease
Control, Atlanta, as of Nov. 7, 1986, was 10,504. Id at 2040. See also supra note 1.
88. See supra notes 34-42 and accompanying text.
89. See infra § 11(2) and accompanying notes.
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der, such as traffic laws. Other acts are criminalized because they
impair another individual's freedom, such as kidnapping or homi-
cide. Yet another group of penalties exist due to paternalism; the
government wishes to protect the individual from himself. These
laws are exemplified by statutes prohibiting the use and possession
of drugs, statutes mandating that a helmet be worn while riding a
motorcycle, and statutes mandating that seatbelts be worn in an
automobile.
The particular criminal statutes addressed in this note were
drafted because the act of transmitting the HIV virus impairs an-
other individual's freedom - freedom to continue life free from in-
tentional harm. The motive behind the enactment of these statutes
is the same as that of murder, manslaughter, and assault.' We, as
members of society, owe a duty to others that share our world; we
all must respect each other's freedom. This raises more questions,
such as, does a fetus in a mother's womb have the same rights as
that of another human being? Does it have a right to life, and do we
owe a duty to ensure that life?91 Or, is the duty merely to give a
fetus a clean slate, free from hazards, if the mother chooses to con-
tinue the pregnancy to term?
This section will attempt to define and balance the constitu-
tional interests of the State, child, and mother. This note discusses
the stage of development at which the State has a compelling inter-
est in the health and welfare of a developing fetus, as balanced
against the mother's right to privacy and bodily autonomy. This
discussion is imperative to the issue of whether women should be
punished for transmitting the virus to their unborn children. If
there is no duty owed to the child, mandating morality in this case
would be the same as transforming functioning members of society
(with full rights) into incubators, subject to extreme state control
for nine months. Only after we have answered these constitutional
questions can we legitimately move on to consider whether judg-
ments about personal morality should enter the realm of public pol-
icy and police.
In order for the State to regulate or intrude upon a fundamental
90. Another reason a duty is imposed on pregnant women is "society's reluctance to
have children born with genetic disease, HIV infection, or perinatal drug addiction may be
motivated as much by economics as by any concern that bearing such children is morally
wrong." Nolan, supra note 37, at 18.
91. This is of course, another topic in and of itself, which will not be discussed in this
note.
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right, its intervention must be subjected to strict scrutiny.9 2 The
State's interest must be deemed "compelling" before it can override
the fundamental right of an individual. 93 The following discussion
attempts to set forth the interests of the State, the child, and the
woman. As any discussion in the realm of reproductive freedom is
never truly settled, 94 the conclusion to this section is merely consis-
tent with logic,95 and with the current Supreme Court determina-
tion of the point at which the State's interest becomes compelling. 96
This section walks through the integral discussion of whether the
State can "mandate maternal responsibility"; this corresponds with
the child's interest in being born free from harm, or, at least, being
born with a sound mind and body.
1. State's Interests
The change in the law granting the fetus independent rights has
led to the increased scope of the State interest. Not only does the
State have an interest in prohibiting abortion after the point of via-
bility97 ; it now has asserted an interest in protecting the fetus' right
to be born with a sound mind and body,98 and in enforcing a legal
maternal duty.99
92. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
93. Id at 482.
94. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (setting the legal standard regarding the issue,
although this holding has been the subject of continued debate since 1973).
95. See Stallman v. Youngquist, 125 Ill. 2d, 267, 278 (1990). ("Logic does not demand
that a pregnant woman be treated in a court of law as a stranger to her developing fetus").
96. See Roe, 410 U.S. 113.
97. Id But see Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 416
(1982) (holding that "[w]hile a State's interest in health regulation becomes compelling at
approximately the end of the first trimester, the State's regulation may be upheld only if it is
reasonably designed to further that interest. If during a substantial portion of the second
trimester the State's regulation departs from accepted medical practice, it may not be upheld
simply because it may be reasonable for the remaining portion of the trimester. Rather, the
State is obligated to make a reasonable effort to limit the effect of its regulations to the period
in the trimester during which its health interest may be furthered.").
98. Womack v. Buchhorn, 187 N.W.2d at 222 (holding that "justice requires that the
principle be recognized that a child has a legal right to begin life with a sound mind and body.
If the wrongful conduct of another interferes with that right, and it can be established by
competent proof that there is a causal connection between the wrongful interference and the
harm suffered by the child when born, damages for such harm should be recoverable by the
child.") Id.
99. For a discussion of the existing law on the liability of pregnant women for harm to
the fetus, see § II supra and accompanying notes. A practical argument for allowing the state
to enforce the maternal duty not to harm her fetus, is rooted in the state's pecuniary interest
in preventing the birth of severely handicapped children who will place great demands on
society's resources. Med Tech, supra note 47, at note 51. See also Smith, The Dangers of
Prenatal Cocaine Use, 13 MATERNAL-CHILD NURSING J. (May/June 1988).
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According to traditional constitutional analysis of due process
rights, if a government regulation impinges upon a fundamental
right, it is subjected to essentially the same type of strict scrutiny
applicable to fundamental rights issues under the Equal Protection
Clause."°° This means that the regulation is invalid unless it is
found to be necessary, and narrowly drawn, for achieving a compel-
ling government interest.101 Since the right to procreate has been
legally identified as a fundamental right,102 the government's inter-
est in enacting these statutes must be compelling.
After the first trimester of pregnancy, the State's interest in the
mother's health (not the fetus') becomes sufficient enough to justify
reasonable regulation of the abortion decision.103 The State's inter-
est in the "potentiality of human life" becomes compelling once the
fetus reaches viability. °4 At this stage, greater regulation is permit-
ted in the interest of protecting the fetus from harm.105 Some
would argue that once a pregnant woman has abandoned her right
to abort and has decided to carry the fetus to term, the State has an
interest in ensuring that the fetus is born as healthy as possible.l06
This argument has been accepted in one jurisdiction, but has not
gained nation-wide acceptance.0 7
States have asserted a compelling interest in the general welfare
of a viable fetus without substantiating this interest.' When the
State tries to prosecute a woman for the delivery of illegal drugs to
her fetus, it bases the prosecution on protecting of the interests of
the child."°9 It has been argued that "[r]ather than promoting any
100. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1000 (lst ed. 1978).
101. Id. at 1002. See also 410 U.S. at 155; 381 U.S. at 485; Kramer v. Union Free School
Dist., 395 u.s. 621, 627 (1969).
102. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (holding that the right to procreate
is "one of the basic civil rights of man").
103. Roe, 410 U.S. 113.
104. Id. at 114.
105. Id.
106. Robertson, supra note 36 at 437.
107. It has been applied in the state of Michigan.
108. See Akron, 462 U.S. at 433-34 (holding that the state's regulation would be held
unconstitutional if its rationale "depart[ed] from acceptable medical practice," or was truly a
disguised imposition of a heavy and unnecessary burden on a woman's access to a relatively
inexpensive, otherwise accessible, and safe abortion).
109. In reality, the motivation is economical as well as public health oriented. See Smith,
The Dangers of Prenatal Cocaine Use, 13 Maternal-Child Nursing J. (May/June 1988) (The
human costs related to the pain, suffering and deaths resulting from maternal cocaine use
during pregnancy are simply incalculable. In economic terms, the typical intensive-care costs
for treating babies exposed to drugs range from $7500 to $31,000. In some cases medical bills
go as high as $150,000).
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legitimate state interest, much less a compelling one, these prosecu-
tions are undermining public health, a fact reflected by the increas-
ingly outspoken opposition of public health organizations to these
prosecutions. For example, fourteen public health and public inter-
est groups... sought to file amicus briefs in opposition to the con-
viction of Jennifer Johnson." 110
The state of Illinois would have a difficult time feigning a "com-
pelling public interest" in the enactment of such a statute, since not
a single public health organization was consulted.1 11 If no organi-
zation representing the public health was even contacted, it would
be very difficult to argue that there was a compelling public health
interest behind the legislature's intent. Perhaps Penny Pullen, the
sponsor of the Illinois bill, could argue that she research statistics
herself. On the other hand, she does not appear to be thoroughly
concerned with the facts. Perhaps the sponsors could just respond
that they do not need experts to assert a compelling public interest
in this area; they are preventing the death of children through gen-
eral deterrence and the punishment of culpable women. If this is
the purpose of the statute, it is overly given the perinatal transmis-
sion statistics.
Another means invoked for regulating this criminalization is the
enforcement of an alleged legal maternal duty.1 12 The scope of this
duty is elusive, arguably ranging from the duty to avoid all harm to
her unborn fetus, to the duty to produce a healthy child. What kind
of duty does a pregnant woman owe? And what corresponding
duty does the State owe to the child to enforce this maternal duty?
Duty is certainly not absolute. Therefore, it is easy to understand
why many have argued for requiring a woman to protect her fetus.
Few would argue that a pregnant woman has absolutely no moral
responsibility to her developing fetus. However, violation of this
moral responsibility not to harm is being transformed into a punish-
able crime.1 1 3
This section will present the three degrees of this maternal duty.
These range from the duty to avoid all harm to the duty to produce
a perfect child. This section will discuss each potential duty, and
will suggest which moral duty may be mandated by the State, with
110. Lynn M. Paltrow, When Becoming Pregnant Is a Crime, 9 CRIM. JUST. ETHics 41,
45 (1990).
111. Isaaenan, supra note 45, at note 43.
112. See generally Wendy K. Mariner et al., Pregnancy, Drugs, and the Perils of Prosecu-
tion, 9 CRIM. JUST. ETHics 30 (1990).
113. See applicable statutes at § III(A) & (B).
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its breach being punishable. Underlying the discussion is the as-
sumption that fetal and maternal rights are being balanced.
At the farthest end of the spectrum lies the obligation to create a
healthy, normal baby. One court phrased the corresponding fetal
right as, the "right to begin life with a sound mind and body." '114
This opinion spawned the "wrongful life doctrine." This doctrine
advocates judging as to whether a child would have been better off if
not born at all.11 This is an extremely dangerous position for any
court to take, as there are no limits to its application, and no clearly
defined methods for determining culpability. Furthermore, there ex-
ist no guidelines for determining which deviant characteristics are
to be considered tragic enough to necessitate valuation of life. 1 6
This is clearly an impractical and dangerous standard.
Some advocates argue that the maternal duty requires the pro-
motion of the well-being of offspring. 7 According to one author,
"the easiest moral obligation to identify in this setting is that of a
woman to promote the well-being of her offspring." ' This obliga-
tion appears easy to identify because "a special obligation to take
care of one's offspring seems to flow naturally out of the relation-
ship of parenting." 1 9 However, there are also recognizable disad-
vantages to this position. "Imposing criminal liability on women
for actions that fail to promote the well-being of future children
embraces a presumption against accepting prenatal risks, possibly
including the risk of genetic or infectious disease." 120
Although the duty to avoid harm is an arguably better standard
to apply than the obligation to give birth to a perfect child, it is still
114. Womack v. Buckhorn, 187 N.W.2d at 222 (cited in Grodin v. Grodin, 301 N.W.2d
869, 870 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980)).
115. Lynn D. Fleischer, Wrongful Births. When Is There Liability for Prenatal Injury?
141 AM. J. DisEASEs CHILDREN 509 (1986) (examining the historical roots of tort liability
for prenatal injury by an author apparently sympathetic to state intervention).
116. "What is the nature of the obligation that parents and possibly others owe to future
children? Are fetuses to be protected from every possible risk of harm? Some have argued
that individual parents have precisely this obligation, and that children have a corresponding
right 'to begin life with a sound mind and body.' On this view, parents 'wrong' a child if they
choose to conceive in the face of substantial risk of transmitting genetic or infectious diseases.
Thus, if the child is likely to be born with a serious illness or disability, the parents are
obligated to avoid childbearing altogether." Nolan, supra note 37, at 17.
117. Id See also Matheiu, Respecting Liberty & Preventing Harm: Limits of State Inter-
vention in Prenatal Choice, 8 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 19 (1985); see also, John A. Robert-
son, Legal Issues in Prenatal Therapy, 29 CLINICAL OBSETRIcs & GYNECOLOGY 603
(1986).
118. Nolan, supra note 37, at 16.
119. Id.
120. Id at 20.
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far from applicable. The "duty to avoid harm" to a developing fe-
tus is ambiguous. This sort of obligation could include any or all of
the following: the duty to avoid all harm, the duty to prevent any
risk of harm, 21 the duty to avoid only some kinds of harm, the duty
to prevent any unreasonable risk of harm, and, even, the duty to
avoid causing death.122 Traditional tort liability is based on one, or
a variety, of these standards, depending upon the circumstances. 23
The situation at hand is unique in that the interacting individuals
are not strangers. They are intimately bonded in one body. In tort
theory, the closer the relationship, the greater the duty owed. The
question is, how high should the standard be when the State is to
enforce it through the use of criminal penalties?
Imposing the duty to avoid all harm could result in the prosecu-
tion of a woman for any harm befalling her unborn child.12 4 The
woman would not be able to drive an automobile, exercise in late
stages of pregnancy, or even leave her house for a walk. Harm can
be lurking in every corner, including within her own body.125 This
duty seems too great a burden to bear.
Implicit in the duty to prevent any risk of harm are the same
criticisms mentioned above,1 26 except that harm would not neces-
sarily have to result for the woman to be found to have breached
her duty. Even getting out of bed could create a risk of harm to the
fetus. Smoking, drinking, and driving, which are all legal activities,
would be prohibited for pregnant women. Therefore, this duty is
arguably too burdensome.
Perhaps a more moderate duty would require the mother to
avoid only some kinds of harm, such as those that result in serious,
irreversible damage. This duty could lead to punishment of women
only for the actual, and not merely possible, consequences of their
actions. This category has not factored out inherited genetic dis-
eases that result in serious irreversible damage, activities which re-
sult in low birth weight, sudden infant death syndrome and
premature birth and its corresponding complications. It also fails
to consider refusals of treatment necessary for the safety of the fetus
121. Similar to the HIV statutes.
122. Of course, consistent with case law, the mother reserves the right to terminate the
pregnancy up to a certain stage. The duty would be imposed only after the woman made the
free choice to continue the pregnancy to term.
123. See Nolan, supra note 37, at 16. (There is a "general duty of individuals to avoid
injuring or harming one another...").
124. This duty is much like the duty to create a healthy child.
125. Referring to disease, or genetic defect.
126. See supra notes 114-25 and accompanying text.
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and the necessary ingestion of medication for the benefit of the
mother, which may have permanent adverse effects on the baby.
27
In effect, the mother may still be punished for any serious harm to
her child, regardless of the legality of the activity that caused the
harm, and regardless of the degree of control she had over the
source of the harm.
A more moderate approach would impose a duty to avoid un-
reasonable risk of harm to the fetus. This duty would factor out
those risks that are practically inherent in our society, such as car
accidents while driving sober, or the risk of harm from exercise or
from drinking coffee. This still leaves a grey area which would in-
clude smoking, drinking moderate amounts of alcohol, and know-
ingly conceiving or continuing a pregnancy when there is a
substantial likelihood that the child will contract Tay-Sachs or any
other genetically transmitted disease. 12 8
As evidenced by the above discussion, there is an inherent prob-
lem in basing a standard on the consequence, or the harm, rather
than on the source of the harm, human conduct. By using conduct
as the measuring stick, the degree of control and knowledge can
then be factored into the obligation, which is a necessary considera-
tion in drafting criminal statutes. But how far should we go? What
kind of conduct should be prohibited? In the HIV specific statutes
sexual intercourse and the donation of blood are specifically men-
tioned as culpable acts.129 An implicitly culpable act with regard to
perinatal transmission is the failure to terminate the pregnancy.
Should we criminalize only conduct that is already illegal, or should
we slide down the "slippery slope" and criminalize conduct during
pregnancy that is normally legal for those that are not carrying a
child? 3' Should we criminalize all "reflexive actions" as well?
127. Grodin, 301 N.W.2d at 869.
128. The likelihood of these kinds of harm being visited on a child, and therefore proving
foreseeability, can be determined by genetic testing or taking an immediate family medical
history.
129. See supra notes 55-70 and accompanying text.
130. Lynn M. Paltrow, When Becoming Pregnant is a Crime, 9 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 41,
42-43 (1990). This author writes that "[t]reating pregnancy as a conflict between maternal
and fetal rights leads inevitably down a slippery slope. Prosecutions of pregnant women
cannot rationally be limited to illegal conduct because many legal behaviors cause damage to
developing babies. Women who are diabetic or obese, women with cancer or epilepsy who
need drugs that could harm the fetus, and women who are too poor to eat adequately or to
get prenatal care could all be characterized as fetal abusers. Pregnant women engage in all
sorts of behaviors that could expose their fetuses to harm, including flying to Europe and
cleaning their cat's litter box. ... In fact, these prosecutions are not limited to pregnant
women who engage in illegal behavior. In Laramie, Wyoming, Diane Pfannenstiel, a preg-
nant woman, was arrested for child abuse when she admitted to the police that she had been
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Perhaps the element of foreseeability should be referred to when
trying to define the judicial standard. 131 This seems to be the path
taken by the states that have enacted statutes criminalizing AIDS
transmission. 132 If it is foreseeable that a risk of harm will come to
a person exposed to the virus, and the infected individual exposes
another to the virus knowing of his infection and the inherent risk,
then she will be subject to criminal penalty.1 33 The Renslow court
reaffirmed the "utility of the concept of duty as a means by which to
direct and control the course of the common law," and went on to
say that "there is a right to be born free from prenatal injuries
foreseeably caused by a breach of duty.... ,134 But this calculation
could lead to infinite liability. It is foreseeable that any act or omis-
sion by a pregnant woman could impact upon fetal development.
1 35
Few, if any, judicially defined standards are as difficult to estab-
lish as that which a mother owes her unborn child. This inherent
difficulty suggests that perhaps the issue should not be in the realm
of judicial discourse at all. Justice Cunningham struggled with this
issue in Stallman v. Youngquist.136 He forcefully wrote,
It must be asked, [b]y what judicially defined standard would a
mother have her every act or omission while pregnant subjected
to State scrutiny? ... Holding a mother liable for the uninten-
tional infliction of prenatal injuries subjects to State scrutiny all
the decisions a woman must make in attempting to carry a preg-
nancy to term, and infringes on her right to privacy and bodily
autonomy. ... Logic does not demand that a pregnant woman
be treated in a court of law as a stranger to her developing
fetus.
137
2. Child's Interests
If the duty is indeed to avoid some kind of harm to the fetus, to
act to protect the fetus or to refrain from intentionally causing harm
to the fetus, then the duty is to the unborn child. 138 In reality, in
drinking alcohol.... And in 1985, Pamela Rae Stewart was charged with 'failing to follow
her doctor's advice' to stay off her feet, to refrain from sexual intercourse ... and seek
immediate medical attention if she experienced difficulties with the pregnancy"). Id.
131. Leon Green, Foreseeability in Negligence Law, 61 COLUM. L. Rav. 1401.
132. See supra notes 55-70 and accompanying text.
133. For a discussion of how these statutes apply to pregnant, HIV-infected women, see
supra notes 71-89 and accompanying text.
134. Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 67 Ill. 2d at 348, 357 (1977).
135. Stallman v. Youngquist, 125 Ill. 2d at 267, 277 (1988).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 277-78.
138. However, Roe, 410 U.S. at 158, 161, held that at no stage of development is a fetus a
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criminal cases, the duty is to the State.139 The State acts as "guard-
ian" of the public interest, and the individual must then answer to
the State. Also, the unborn child has no other party acting in its
interest; therefore, the state represents the unborn child's interest by
mandating the duty. 4
But since the child is housed in the woman's body, the duty
actually imposed upon the pregnant woman only requires that she
take care of herself. This can be supported by the fact that few
prosecutions of drug-using women have demonstrated that a drug
actually caused harm to a newborn. 14 1 What they are prosecuting is
the conduct that exposed the child to risk.142 This suggests that it is
not enough to avoid harm. The duty implied is really a duty to
prevent any risk of harm. The only way to prevent any risk of harm
is to take care of her body. If her body is unhealthy, so is the baby.
Contrary to the State's purported interest in the life of the fetus,
the laws which criminally punish perinatal transmission of the HIV
virus fail to promote the child's best interest. These laws inher-
ently favor abortion, since this is virtually the only way the mother
can avoid prosecution.143 Abortion is one hundred percent effective
in terminating a fetus' life. In fact, the most tragic characteristic of
AIDS is its deadly nature, and the corresponding lack of a cure.
However, just as babies born addicted to drugs have a good chance
of surviving, so do babies born HIV-positive. In AIDS cases, wo-
men infected with HIV only have a twenty to thirty percent risk of
transmitting the infection to their offspring. 1  Of those infants that
'person' with rights separate from the woman. Neither legally nor biologically are fetuses
independent parties with rights enforceable against the woman.
139. Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health Servs., 462 U.S. 416, 427, 430-31
(1983) In order for the state to interfere, it must prove that is has a compelling interest and
must demonstrate that the law is narrowly tailored and furthers the asserted interest. Id
140. Paul A. Logli, Drugs in the Womb: The Newest Battlefield in the War on Drugs, 9
CaiM. JuST. ETHIcs 23, 27 (1990) ("[t]he belief that parents can best fulfil their responsibili-
ties to their children if free from intervention is naive in the fetal abuse context. Children
have separate and distinct legal rights, and are entitled to the protection of the law, even from
their parents.") (citing Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 37, 804-1 (1987)).
141. See Wendy K. Mariner, Leonard H. Glantz & George J. Annas, Pregnancy, Drugs,
and the Perils of Prosecution, 9 CiM. JusT. ETHics 30, 33-34 (1990).
142. Id. at 31.
143. See infra notes 147-51 and accompanying text.
144. Philip A. Pizzo, Emerging concepts of the Treatment of HIV Infection in Children,
262 JAMA 199 (1989). Some of the HIV-infected infants are born close to death, others will
sicken within the first few months of life and die quickly, and still others will have evidence of
disease intermittently over the years. Nevertheless, some may remain healthy for years; some
children aged five or six are only now developing symptoms of HIV illness. I. Auger et al.,
Incubation Periods for Pediatric AIDS Patients. 336 NATURE 575, 575-77 (1988).
Approximately 4,000-5,000 infants annually are expected to acquire HIV infection in this
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are infected, some may remain asymptomatic for many years, even
in the absence of treatment.1 45  Given these statistics, the statute
acts contrary to the child's best interest.
3. Mother's Interests
Justifying state intervention in human development is not as
easy as finding a compelling state interest in ensuring the interests
of the child. We must also consider the rights of the pregnant wo-
man to privacy, bodily autonomy, and equal protection of the laws.
Only after we have carefully weighed these fundamental rights
against the State's and child's interests can we decide that criminal-
izing perinatal HIV-transmission is unconstitutional.
A. Right to Privacy and a Woman's Liberty Interest
In 1973, the Supreme Court held that a woman has a legal right
to decide for herself whether she shall conceive and bear a child. 146
Even though this right was discovered in the context of the abortion
issue, it alternatively extends to the right to procreate 47 and the
right to use contraception.1 48
A woman has a great deal of latitude in making reproductive
decisions. Consequently, the State's right to protect the fetus from
harm, as well as the fetus' right to be free from harm, must strongly
override the woman's right, to bear a child. This holds true even
when the woman is infected with HIV.
By criminally penalizing a woman infected with HIV for bear-
ing a child, the State would be unconstitutionally imposing upon
her reproductive freedom. The State would be placing her in a no-
win situation, by defining her options as 1) giving up her child
fashion. At least 15%-20% of infected infants will die before the age of one year, while
others will have poor growth, neurologic dysfunction, and frequent infections. Ben Z. Katz,
Natural History and Clinical Management of the Infant Born to a Mother Infected with
Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 13 Seminars in Perinatology 27 (1989); I. Auger et al.,
Incubation Periods for Pediatric AIDS Patients, 336 NATURE 575 (1988).
145. However, the reality of the disease is that the children who are born with the HIV
virus in their systems are destined to manifest the symptoms, and eventually die of AIDS.
146. Roe, 410 U.S. 113.
147. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. at 541 (where the court referred to the right to
procreate as one of the basic civil rights of man).
148. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (invalidating a state law that made it a
crime for any person to use contraceptives, including married persons. The court held that
the statute infringed upon a constitutionally protected zone of marital privacy). See also Ei-
senstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (where the court reasoned that the decision whether to
use contraceptives was one of individual privacy, and thus the right belonged to single as well
as married people).
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through abortion and avoiding prosecution, or 2) giving birth and
spending the rest of her life in jail. These choices are severely re-
strictive as compared to those reproductive choices afforded to a
woman who is not-infected with HIV. 149 The only way an HIV-
infected woman can avoid violating the law is by terminating her
pregnancy, because having the child violates the statute regardless
of whether she actually transmitted HIV to the infant."'0 An HIV-
infected woman can avoid violating the law only by surrendering
reproductive autonomy, and aborting.1 51
State intervention in fetal development also invades a woman's
right to bodily autonomy. Advocates of State intervention argue
that there is no invasion of bodily autonomy when a state restricts
or compels activities during pregnancy, including abortion. They
argue that once a woman chooses to conceive and continue the
pregnancy and the State chooses to protect the fetus,152 the woman
loses the liberty to act in ways that would adversely affect the fetus.
They further argue that since the maternal-fetal conflicts that arise
149. Currently, a woman has the freedom to contracept, to abort, to give her child up for
adoption, or to bear and keep her child. And contrary to those who are HIV-infected, there
are also no restrictions on her freedom to have sexual intercourse.
150. ILL REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-16.2 (1989). "The reality of the social unac-
ceptability of the disease is that many HIV-infected babies are no worse off than babies born
with other severe and life-threatening birth conditions, yet there are no comparable claims
that all such babies should have been aborted. Indeed, as a society we point proudly to
expensive and technically elaborate neonatal intensive-care units constructed to support the
imperiled lives of premature infants." See supra note 80, Levine & Dubler, at 328-29
(nondirective counseling given by genetic counselors to couples who are at risk of giving birth
to abnormal children, including Tay-Sachs carriers. See also Arras supra note 37, at 367.
Yet we coercively and publicly direct HIV-infected women not to have children. In Decem-
ber 1985, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) publicly recommended that HIV-infected
women should "be advised to consider delaying pregnancy until more is known about per-
inatal transmission of the virus," and the head of the CDC AIDS program, Dr. James Curran
stated in an interview that "[s]omeone who understands the disease and is logical will not
want to be pregnant and will consider the test results when making family planning deci-
sions." Levine & Dubler, supra note 80, at 321.
151. Even this option may be taken away from women. Abortion rights have been in-
creasingly threatened, by prohibiting federal funds from being used to perform abortions, or
even discuss the option of abortion. See Rust v. Sullivan, Ill. S.Ct. 1759 (1991). Medicaid
payments for abortion can only be used in cases in which the woman's life is endangered by
her continued pregnancy. "Many states, urged on by Right to Life organizations, have lim-
ited further funding. Five states provide some limited further services and only 12 provide
for general funding of poor women's abortions. For poor women in Michigan and Nevada,
abortion for the reason of a possibly HIV-infected child is not an option." See Levine, supra
note 80, at 340.
152. See Note, Constitutional Limitations on State Intervention in Prenatal Care, 67 VA.
L. REv. 1051 (1981) (suggesting that certain state restrictions on pregnant women would be
constitutional). The state would, of course, be free to favor the woman's autonomy over the
fetus' well-being at any point in the pregnancy, if that choice were politically acceptable.
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in managing pregnancy do not involve the woman's right to procre-
ate, but rather only affect how she will behave in carrying the child
to term, no constitutional right has been trampled. 53 To the con-
trary, implicitly demanding an abortion is as invasive as a court
order requiring a blood transfusion or fetal surgery to save the child
against the mother's wishes.15 4
B. Equal Protection
Criminalizing perinatal transmission punishes women for carry-
ing their babies to term. The State is effectively punishing a state of
being, not an act. It is similar to "convicting one for being an ad-
dict, being a chronic alcoholic, being 'mentally ill or a leper'.... ,,15
Advocates of prosecution argue that the State is punishing women
for the act of transmission. However, that transmission flows from
the state of being pregnant. It is a reflexive act of the condition of
pregnancy. It therefore does not refute the argument that the State
is punishing the state of being a pregnant, HIV-infected woman.
Furthermore, the statutes prohibit the creation of a risk of infection.
The state of pregnancy itself creates a risk of prenatal infection,
making the condition of pregnancy punishable." 6 This violates
both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments requiring equal pro-
tection of the laws and prohibiting cruel and unusual
punishment. 157
Another equal protection problem arises if the HIV-transmis-
sion statutes are invoked to protect infants from perinatal infection.
When discussing the issue of fetal endangerment, some people will
be quick to blame the female partner for any damage. This is a
natural response, given the biological necessity of the child to be
153. Robertson, supra note 36, at 437.
154. Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 201 A.2d 537, 538 (per
curiam), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964) (ordering a blood transfusion on a twenty-three-
year-old Jehovah's Witness, who was eight months pregnant and in danger of severe hemor-
rhaging, because the "unborn child is entitled to the law's protection." The woman left the
hospital before the blood transfusion could be administered).
155. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968) (decision quashed by the Florida Supreme
Court in 602 So.2d 1288 (Fla. 1992) the Florida Supreme Court; see also Robinson v. Califor-
nia, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (where the court held a statute invalid which made it a criminal
offense to be addicted to the use of narcotics).
156. Johnson v. State, No. 89-1765 (Fla. Dist. CL App., 5th Dist., 1989) (Johnson's real
crime was not delivery of drugs but the delivery of her child: "When she delivered that baby,
she broke the law in the state." The court agreed with this formulation of the crime, noting
that Jennifer Johnson "made a choice to become pregnant and to allow those pregnancies to
come to term.").
157. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII, XIV § 1.
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dependent upon its mother for protection, nourishment and devel-
opment.158 However, the mother may not be the only source of
harm. The definition of "perinatal" implies a connection between
mother and child, not between father and child. Obviously, men
can't bear children. They may be prosecuted under this statute for
infecting the mother, but the law imposes no morality upon the fa-
ther on behalf of the child. Furthermore, the mother is the direct
link between the virus and the child. It is essentially the woman
who pulls the trigger. The father can never play this role since his
blood supply is necessarily disconnected from the child's. However,
it is possible for a child to contract the HIV virus through its fa-
ther's sperm. 159 Furthermore, women commonly contract the HIV
virus from the father of the child during conception or during preg-
nancy."6 Therefore, the mother may not be entirely at fault. To
blame her for the transmission may be to blame an innocent party
or to ignore a guilty one.
Half of all the genetic information needed to create a child is
contained in the father's sperm. As it is a bodily fluid, the HIV
158. See Nolan, supra note 37, at 16. "Because of the pregnant woman's necessary col-
laboration in the daily developmental progress of a fetus's prenatal growth, her role in procre-
ation assumes a visibility and an ongoing potency that in some sense dwarf the parental
responsibility of her male sex partner .... [Fathers would seem to share equally in any duty
to prevent genetic risk or to avoid prenatal hazards that are generated within the home or
through the couple's shared activities." ld
159. See G. J. Stewart et al., Transmission of Human T-cell Lymphotropic Virus Type III
(HTLV-1Il) By Artificial Insemination By Donor, 2 LANCET 581 (1985).
160. Mary E. Guinan & Ann Hardy, Epidemiology of AIDS in Women in the United
States, 257 JAMA 2039-42 (1987) These authors conducted a study of the incidence of AIDS
infection in women and pediatric patients. The authors found that the major transmission
category for women with AIDS (52%) was intravenous drug use and the second largest cate-
gory was heterosexual contact with a person at risk for AIDS (21%). Of the 456 total re-
ported adults in the study with AIDS whose only risk factor was heterosexual contact with a
person at risk for AIDS, 381 (84%) were women. Out of these 381 women, heterosexual
contact with an intravenous drug user accounted for 67% of women with AIDS, whereas
16% of contacts were bisexual men, 1% were men with hemophilia, and 16% were men with
other or unreported risk factors. Id. at 2040.
Most notably, Between 1982 and 1986, the increase in the number of women with AIDS
in the intravenous drug user, heterosexual contact, and unknown risk groups was paralleled
in the increase in pediatric patients whose mother were in those risk groups. Id.
The authors further noted that the larger number of heterosexually acquired AIDS cases
among women is most probably the result of two factors: 1) a greater proportion of men are
infected, and therefore a woman is more likely than a man to encounter an infected partner,
and 2) the efficiency of transmission of HIV from man to woman may be greater than from
woman to man. Id. at 2041.
The authors finally note that the human immunodeficiency virus has been transmitted to
women during artificial insemination when infected semen was injected directly into the
uterus through a catheter. From this information they conclude that transmission of the
virus presumably can occur during penile-vaginal intercourse. Id.
HEALTH MATRIX
virus has been found in sperm.1 61 There is also some question as to
whether HIV is housed in DNA, with the sperm carrying DNA to
trigger the process of conception. Even if the virus was not trans-
mitted by DNA, and was only traveling with the spermatic fluid,
the father could still be at fault for infecting the mother, who in
turn infects the child. 162
Some studies of women and AIDS have linked a substantial
number of pediatric AIDS cases with fathers who are in one of the
identified high-risk categories for AIDS. 163 Yet the HIV-specific
statutes do not recognize a sufficiently direct causal connection be-
tween the father and the child. This often leads to prosecution of
the mother as a criminal, rather than to protection of the mother as
a victim. The mother should have a right to protection by the same
statute against a man who transmitted the virus not only to her, but
to her unborn child.
One more equal protection problem arises; the punishment for
transmitting a disease such as AIDS does not equally apply to all
genetically transmitted diseases, although they may be equally as
devastating.164 One doctor suggests that "HIV-infected women
could be specifically exempted from a law restricting abortion"
since the birth of an HIV-infected baby is "worse" than the birth of
a baby with other illnesses. 165 This position stems from the percep-
tion that there is an increased burden on public assistance by
mothers who are poor women of color with a chronic, and ulti-
mately lethal, disease. However, as mentioned above, 166 mothers
who give birth to babies with other devastating problems are also
often poor, uninsured and in need of public assistance. "If there is
to be one standard [based upon an economic or a moral argument],
it should be applied equally to cystic fibrosis, Down syndrome,
spina bifida, [Tay-Sachs, sickle-cell anemia,] and HIV disease, and
any other defects of prematurity that adequate prenatal care would
161. See supra note 159.
162. In a study done by Sheldon Landesman, Howard Minkoff, Susan Holman, Sandra
McCalla, and Odalis Sijin, Serosurvey of Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection in Par-
turients, 258 JAMA 2701-03 (1987), the authors found that 148 out of 602 women had a self-
identified risk factor. Among the women with risk factors, 23 were past or current intrave-
nous drug users, and 23 has sex partners who used intravenous drugs. Seventy-six women
had a sexual partner from or were themselves from an area where the AIDS virus is endemic,
such as Haiti or Central Africa.
163. See supra notes 162 and 160.
164. See Arras, supra note 37, at 366-67.
165. Stephen C. Joseph, Abortions by the Busload?, N.Y. NEWSDAY, May 5, 1989 at 86.
166. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
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prevent." 16
7
The constitutional arguments for and against punishing per-
inatal HIV transmission include the State's interest in protecting
the fetus from harm, and in enforcing maternal responsibilities to
ensure the child's right to be born with a sound mind and body.
But these interests must be weighed against the woman's fundamen-
tal right to reproductive freedom, which includes her rights to pri-
vacy and bodily autonomy. Furthermore, prosecuting only women
for the crime of perinatal transmission ignores the reality that the
father of the child may be equally culpable, and illustrates a strange
form of cruel and unusual punishment in prosecuting a woman for
the mere state of being pregnant.
V. POLICY ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST
PUNISHING PERINATAL HIV TRANSMISSION
Constitutional considerations are not the only factors which
commonly weigh on a decision to mandate or penalize certain be-
haviors. Questions of public policy arise in the context of criminal-
izing perinatal HIV infection. We must consider the harmful
results these statutes would have for all HIV-infected women, espe-
cially poor minorities. We must also consider whether criminaliz-
ing this type of "conduct" truly satisfies the ultimate goals of
criminal penalty: reformation, deterrence (both general and spe-
cific), incapacitation/isolation, and retribution. In light of these
public policy considerations, the solution to the problem of pediat-
ric AIDS transmission lies in a solution outside of the criminal
arena.
1. Intrusions/Harm to all HIV-infected Women
Since the government has made the judgment that it is better to
abort an HIV-infected child than to risk carrying it to term and
having it born infected, the application of the law implies that HIV-
infected women should be sterilized, or prohibited from procreating
entirely.168 As a result of forced or coerced169 abortions, in some
167. Levine, supra note 80, at 346.
168. The same "option" is offered to women who are drug-dependent and pregnant. One
author points to the reality that "[w]hen criminal prosecution takes the place of treatment
and support, the symbolism that emerges is not only that women should not use drugs while
pregnant, but that women who use drugs should not become pregnant." See Nolan, supra
note 37, at 20 (emphasis in original).
169. See Levine & Dubler, supra note 80, at 337. "At different times and in various ways,
American society has attempted to control women's reproductive decisions. Although some
attempts were frankly coercive, such as the forced sterilization of Puerto Rican women in the
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cultures, women must forego their remaining source of personal
identity and social status, 170 or act contrary to their religious
beliefs.1
71
There is much case law contradicting the prohibition of concep-
tion; in fact, there is not one Supreme Court case that allows a state
or the federal government to prohibit procreation. 172 That right is
rooted in our Judeo-Christian values, and there is no possibility that
this position will change given the trend of the court to limit a wo-
man's right to abort. Prohibiting procreation is contrary to our val-
ues and our system of justice.1 73 Should such a strongly protected
right be suspended in particular cases?174 Or is this making a value
judgment regarding the quality of life? 175
Restricting the right to procreate can have a devastating effect
on a poor woman or a woman of color. In some cultures, "the ab-
sence of alternative sources of self-realization, satisfaction,... com-
fort," and love make it imperative for a woman to retain the option
to become a parent.1 76 Asking them to refrain permanently from
childbearing may amount to asking them to forgo their only re-
1950s, even the 'voluntary' ones quickly evolved into efforts to restrict women's reproductive
ights.... Whether the underlying 'defect' was poverty or sickle-cell trait, coercion never lay
far behind counseling." Id
170. For a discussion of the cultural significance of childbearing, see John D. Arras,
AIDS and Reproductive Decisions: Having Children in Fear and Trembling, 1990 MiLBANK
Q. 353, 368.
171. See Levine & Dubler, supra note 80, at 332-34.
172. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 438 (1972) (stating [i]f the right to privacy has
any meaning at all, then it is the right of the individual to be free from unwarranted govern-
ment intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision to bear or
beget a child"); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (denying the power to sterilize
repeat criminal offenders, with the Supreme Court characterizing marriage and procreation
as "basic civil rights of man").; Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (denying the power to
prohibit interracial marriage and presumably, in turn, to prohibit the procreation of mixed-
race children; hence, holding state legislation that would limit or regulate procreation will be
subject to the strictest of constitutional scrutiny); but see Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 1207
(1927) (Holmes stating, "[t]hree generations of imbeciles are enough," therefore allowing
Virginia law to sterilize mental defectives). However, NOWAK ET AL., HANDBOOK ON CON-
SnrrUTIONAL LAW, at 625 suggests that "it is doubtful the Supreme Court would follow
Buck v. Bell today."
173. Another well-established precedent is that there is no right to sterilize a woman
without her consent. Relf v. Weinberger, 372 F. Supp. 1196 (D.D.C. 1974), vacated by 565
F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Yet the legislature has the right to mandate abortion? This di-
rectly conflicts with the right to procreate.
174. Lynn M. Paltrow, When Becoming Pregnant Is A Crime, 9 CRIM. JusT. ETHics 41,
42 (1990). (stating "[b]ecause these prosecutions penalize a woman for her decision to con-
tinue a pregnancy, they violate constitutional privacy guarantees that protect the right to
decide whether to bear or begat a child").
175. For a discussion of the "wrongful life" doctrine, see supra note 37.
176. Arras, supra note 37, at 368.
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maining source of personal identity and social status.177 Further-
more, mandating abortion may also intrude upon a woman's
religious values. 178
These statutes also require that any HIV-infected person avoid
sex entirely. Every statute which criminalizes AIDS transmission
expressly prohibits sexual or intimate contact. Therefore, a woman
immediately becomes criminally liable just from conceiving, be-
cause conception necessarily means there was intercourse. There is
only one sexual circumstance that the Supreme Court has held is
not protected by the right of privacy - homosexual sodomy.'79
Otherwise, the right to privacy encompasses decisions regarding
family, marriage and procreation. 1 0 Inherent within the scope of
these decisions is the choice to have sexual intercourse.' 8 '
As already mentioned, the law implicitly advocates abortion
rather than childbirth, to avoid the risk of prosecution. This right is
constitutionally guaranteed at the present time. 8 2 The State cer-
tainly has the right to encourage or, even, to fund abortion, but its
traditional policy choice has always been to encourage childbirth
rather than abortion. This is accomplished through funding8 3 and
through restricting the right to abort.'8 4 By the mere existence of
177. One HIV-infected woman explained why she wanted to have a baby. She stated that
"I really wanted something of mine, you know, mine, mine. I don't have nothing in this
world .... nothing that I really care about." Levine & Dubler, supra note 80, at 335.
Another author wrote that "[c]hildlessness is a very serious concern in communities of color.
As a result of cultural norms and restricted opportunities for women to have a professional
career, motherhood and family are generally valued very highly." L. Nsiah-Jefferson, Repro-
ductive Laws, Women of Color, and Low-Income Womenm in REPRODUCTIVE LAWS FOR THE
1990's, A BRIEFING HANDBOOK (S. Cohen and N. Taub eds., 1989).
178. Church and religion play a major role in many African-American women's lives.
Not only are they the source of religious doctrine, which is clearly opposed to abortion, but
prevention messages are confined to condemning homosexual behavior, sex outside marriage,
and unnatural forms of contraception. Given these sorts of ethics, mandating abortion would
be an affront to a woman's religious beliefs. See also Levine & Dubler, supra note 80, at 332-
34.
179. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
180. See Id.
181. Of course, this right is limited in specific circumstances. There is no constitutional
right to rape, nor to have sex with a child, nor to have a homosexual relationship. However,
if the relationship is heterosexual, and the other partner consents, there are no limitations.
182. Roe, 410 U.S. 113.
183. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (the right to terminate a pregnancy does not
carry with it the right to receive public funds for such termination). See also Webster, 492
U.S. at 507, 511 (the state need not permit public employees or the use of public facilities to
perform abortions).
184. The Court has invalidated state laws that require that abortions be performed only
in full service hospitals, or only after approval of another doctor, or only by certification of a
hospital committee. The rationale behind this ruling lies in the fact that there is no reason-
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these criminalization statutes, the legislatures have clearly made a
policy decision which contradicts the current implication that child-
birth is a decision that should be chosen over abortion. And again,
in adjudicating the cases based on these criminal statutes, the courts
would be faced with contradicting well-established precedent.
The irony in mandating abortion is the fact that abortions are
100% guaranteed to ensure that the child does not survive. But the
child has, at maximum, only a 30% chance of contracting the HIV
virus and dying short of a normal life expectancy. In reality, sug-
gesting abortion triples, if not ensures, the risk of infant mortality.
The reality of the situation is that if the woman is not sterilized,
does not avoid procreation, does not avoid sex, or chooses not to
abort if contraception fails, she is subject to prosecution. Advocates
of prosecution argue that the act of getting pregnant was avoidable,
and therefore the woman has voluntarily subjected herself to the
punishment. Drawing an analogy to prenatal drug delivery illus-
trates that the policy arguments against prosecuting women with
AIDS clearly outweigh the arguments in favor of this legislation.
It can be argued that, in both situations, the women had the
choice whether or not to get pregnant. Therefore, if we can prose-
cute drug-addicted mothers, we can prosecute HIV-infected
mothers for allowing themselves to get pregnant knowing their un-
stable and unhealthy condition. But the question then becomes
whether to abort or not, and that raises issues of religion"8 5 and
ability to pay. Both may be considered involuntary limitations on
women's free choice.18 6
The fact of the matter is, taking drugs is voluntary. Contracting
HIV is not."8 7 Since contracting HIV was involuntarily conferred
able medical basis for such regulations that bear on the mother's health. Doe v. Bolton, 410
U.S. 179 (1973); Akron, 462 U.S. 416; Thornborgh v. American College of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (overruled by Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v.
Casey, 112 S.Ct. 2791 (1992)) (the State may not require recitation of a lengthy and rigid list
of information that is designed to discourage abortion or that interferes with her physician's
professional judgment).
185. See supra note 178.
186. See Nolan, supra note 37, at 18. "If women are unable to choose not to conceive or
not to remain pregnant, then the involuntary nature of their relationship changes its moral
character. Women whose sexual partners refuse to use contraception or who are at risk of
being beaten if they seek an abortion, or women who are unable to contracept or abort be.
cause of their financial status, may stand in a different moral relation to their offspring than
women who can freely choose to become pregnant and care for a child." Id.
187. The fact is that a woman is not forced unwillingly to ingest drugs. She knowingly
accepts the drugs into her system. It cannot be argued that one can voluntarily or willingly
contract AIDS. On one hand, the mother who has AIDS does not intentionally want to
harm her fetus - she performs no act or omission which harms her baby - her condition harms
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on the mother, she should not be punished for transmitting it to her
child. However, advocates of prosecuting drug-addicted pregnant
argue that a crack addicted mother should be prosecuted because
she had brought her drug addiction upon herself, and upon her
child. Since she could have abstained from using drugs during preg-
nancy, and therefore, could have given birth to a healthy child, she
voluntarily chose the result. Alternatively, an HIV-infected woman
cannot simply "turn off" her infection during pregnancy like a wo-
man can stop taking drugs.'' 8 This difference makes HIV infection
a much more difficult case to penalize, as distinguished from the
prosecution of drug-addicted pregnant women.
The final problem created by these criminalization statutes is
their deterrent effect upon pregnant women from seeking consistent,
prenatal health care.18 9 They fear spending time in jail, and/or los-
ing their children. This argument was originally presented with re-
gard to prosecuting crack mothers. But it could be easily
analogized to HIV-infected mothers in an even stronger manner.
Generally speaking, HIV-positive women do not to want to spend
their last days in jail, which would waste precious time they could
have spent with their child. Irrespective of the AIDS epidemic,
poor, black or Hispanic pregnant women are often denied equal ac-
cess to prenatal care.190 They are also often denied access to drug
rehabilitation programs because many of the programs are not
designed to deal with pregnant women. 9 ' Furthermore, the pros-
her child. On the other hand, the drug-addicted mother voluntarily takes drugs; another
mother doesn't seek out pre-natal care. But, drug-addiction can be considered a disease or an
involuntary condition.
However, it can be argued that the transmission of either the addiction or the virus is
involuntary. It is a natural result of the fetus' biological and physical dependence on the
mother. This fact does not change the ultimate result of the discussion.
188. Of course, there is the argument that a drug addiction is compulsory and involun-
tary, and one cannot simply "turn it off," or quit cold turkey. There is also the problem of
fetal distress and death if the mother goes into withdrawal. The fetus could die in utero.
189. Mising Links: Coordinating Fed. Drug Policy for Women, Infants & Children:
Hearing before Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1989).
190. As one author writes, "[i]n contrast to their middle-class critics, who would have
them exercise greater reproductive responsibility, the women we are talking about suffer daily
from intense social discrimination and lack of access to the most basic levels of prenatal and
primary medical care, effective drug rehabilitation, sex education, and abortion services....
Clearly, our society must be condemned for failing to provide HIV-infected women with
decent and humane medical services and more equitable social opportunities." Arras, supra
note 37, at 358-59. See also Levine & Dubler, supra note 80, at 339-42 (noting that "access to
health care in the inner city varies from limited to nonexistent").
191. See W. Chavkin, Testimony presented to the U.S. Congress, House Select Commit-
tee on Children, Youth and Families (April 27, 1989) (reporting that prenatal care for drug
users is grossly inadequate, and most drug-treatment programs do not enroll pregnant wo-
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pect of being forced to abort may create an additional disincentive
to seek out prenatal care. Even if the woman had decided that she
would abort the fetus, she may have been unable to find a clinic or
physician willing to perform the procedure.1 92 Applying these
criminalization laws to pregnant women will create another disin-
centive to seeking prenatal care, for women who are in special need
of pre-partum and post-partum care.
2. Poor Disproportionately Affected
In drug-addiction cases, the mothers are often poor and, not un-
commonly, black. 193 Interestingly, one source denies that the prob-
lem of drug-addicted babies is restricted to the poor.194 Another
men and are not set up to permit a woman with child-care responsibilities to comply with the
rules).
192. A recent survey conducted by the AIDS Discrimination Division of the New York
City Commission on Human Rights found a systemic barrier to abortions for women who
reveal that they are HIV positive. In that study, 20 of the 30 clinics and private doctors
called would not keep the appointment after the caller identified herself as an HIV patient.
Twelve of the 30 providers indicated that they could not perform the procedure because of
the unavailability of infection-control precautions, and not a single provider located in Brook-
lyn would make an appointment. Katherine M. Franke, HIV-Related Discrimination in
Abortion Clinics in New York City, City of New York Commission on Human Rights, AIDS
Discrimination Division, June, 1989.
Another author notes that "some abortion clinics demonstrated the same reluctance to
serve HIV-infected women as did other types of medical facilities. Those clinics which did
serve these women often marked charts visibly, insisted on 'spacesuit' infection control meas-
ures, served the HIV-infected women last during the clinic session, and kept her away from
other women having procedures, thus denying her peer support. Other clinics simply refused
to serve any women who, by medical and sexual history, might be at risk of HIV infection."
THE AIDS EPIDEMIC: PRIVATE RIGHTS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 390 (PADRAIG
O'MALLEY ED., 1989).
193. Kathleen Nolan stated in Protecting Fetuses, supra note 37 that "[a]cts potentially
harmful to a fetus cannot be defined with sufficient precision to give notice to mothers of the
legal behavioral standard. The statute probably would be enforced only against poor
mothers, because they often are in closer contact with government's monitors and generally
are in poorer health." She also stated that "both cigarette use and drug use are strongly
correlated with socioeconomic status" Id. at 18, and later goes on to say that "[s]ince drug
use is correlated with socioeconomic status and therefore with racial background, pursuing a
criminal justice approach will obviously have a disparate impact on black and Hispanic as
opposed to white communities." Id. at 20. Lynn M. Paltrow, infra note 195, illustrates a sad
example of prosecution in S. Carolina. She writes, "In Charleston, women who come into the
public hospital for prenatal care or delivery are selectively tested for drugs; those who test
positive have their names turned over to the police. The women, who are still recovering
from the delivery, are handcuffed and taken to jail and stay there until they can make bail.
At least one woman arrived at the jail still bleeding from the delivery; she was told to sit on a
towel."
194. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR PERINATAL ADDICTION RESEARCH AND EDUCA-
TION (NAPARE), Update, March, 1989 enclosure, and A First: National Hospital Incidence
Survey, and Substances Most Commonly Abused During Pregnancy and Their Risks to Mother
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study conducted at Hutzel Hospital in Detroit's inner city found
that 42.7% of its newborn babies had been exposed to drugs while
in their mothers' wombs. 195 Since the majority of maternity pa-
tients who come to a public hospital are poor and/or black or his-
panic, they are often subjected to random drug testing, which would
not be so readily applied in any sort of private hospital. 196 Statistics
clearly support the fact that, even if the actual statutes do not exclu-
sively affect women of color, the cases which are actually prose-
cuted generally only involve black women. All of the recent
prosecutions of pregnant women have been brought against poor
women, with several of them battered women, and the majority of
them women of color.1 97
It has been proven that a substantial number of drug-addicted
mothers are giving birth to drug-addicted babies. There is an addi-
tional life-threatening risk that may be involved with the injection
of drugs. The risk of HIV infection comes along with sharing need-
les. These mothers who are giving birth to AIDS babies are also
often poor.198 If the state were to prosecute these mothers for trans-
mitting the virus to their children, the poor would then be dispro-
portionately impacted by the statute, or at least by the prosecution.
Another problem that affects the disadvantaged is the fact that
contraceptive services are frequently not readily available to the
poor. 199 When contraception is not freely available to them, they
are likely to be unable to prevent pregnancy and the spread of
disease.2°
and Baby (May 1989) (indicating that the problem of maternal cocaine use during pregnancy
was not restricted to urban populations or particular racial or socio-economic groups).
195. Hundley, Infants A Growing Casualty of the Drug Epidemic, CH. TRIB., Oct. 16,
1989, at 1.
196. Lynn M. Paltrow, When Becoming Pregnant Is a Crime, 9 CRIM. JUST. ETHics, 41
(1990).
197. Tom Coakley, Suspect is Said to Be Battered, Frightened, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 23,
1989, at 22. See also, Paltrow, supra note 196 (stating "[p]rosecutions of pregnant women...
may also raise race discrimination claims or ... issues of selective prosecution because so
many of them are directed against poor women of color. A recent study conducted by
NAPARE ... found that, although the rate of drug use by Black women and white women
was the same, Black women were reported for their drug use ten times more often than white
women." )
198. Levine & Dubler, supra note 80, at 325 writing that "[d]rug-using women are more
likely to have an infected needle-sharing partner and thereby to contract HIV... [n]on-drug-
using heterosexual women are more likely to have an HIV-infected sexual partner in commu-
nities with high seroprevalence rates - that is, poor inner-city neighborhoods").
199. Helen L. Smits, Women, Health and Development: An American Perspective, 104
ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 2, 263 (1986).
200. See supra notes 190-91 discussing clinic availability.
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Finally, since abortion is the only way to avoid prosecution, 2°1 a
woman is further disadvantaged because she is denied information,
access and governmentally subsidized abortion services. She cannot
be counseled on abortion by family planning clinics that receive fed-
eral funds, even if she initiates the discussion. 2 Generally speak-
ing, her doctor cannot refer her to an abortion clinic; and she often
cannot discuss the abortion option with her own physician.20 3 Since
most of the financially disadvantaged frequent federally-funded
public hospitals or clinics, they are categorically denied information
and opportunity. In effect, these women will be forced to carry
their children to term, risking prosecution.
3. Prosecuting HIV-Infected Women for Transmitting AIDS to
their Children Does Not Ultimately Satisfy the Four
Purposes of the Criminal Law.
This section delves into another criticism of punishing these wo-
men; such punishment does not effectively serve even one of the
four purposes of the criminal justice system. The four purposes to
be examined are as follows: reformation or rehabilitation, deter-
rence, incapacitation or isolation, and retribution.
The goal of reformation or rehabilitation is to render offenders
nondangerous. °4 Reformation cannot apply in the case of perinatal
transmission because it is impossible to reform a woman who has
reflexively infected her child with HIV. One cannot teach her not to
reflexively infect her next child with HIV.205 Unlike an axe-mur-
derer, she cannot choose to reform her behavior. She cannot cure
herself, and there is no treatment a correctional institution could
impose or offer that would cure her.2' 6 The only reformation that
could theoretically be achieved would be to convince her not to
201. An HIV-infected woman cannot avoid prosecution by taking her chances and carry-
ing it to term, since that would still be creating a risk of transmission. Once you are preg-
nant, the only way to avoid prosecution is to terminate the pregnancy.
202. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S.Ct. 1759 (1991).
203. Id.
204. MICHAEL MOORE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY 234 (1984). Moore also outlines
two different ways of achieving this goal. Correctional institutions may either employ harsh
treatment by inmates and guards or extensive therapy. Harsh treatment results in the of-
fender becoming penitent or no longer willing to commit crimes in order to avoid such harsh
treatment in the future. Extensive therapy, which is much more expensive than harsh treat-
ment, not only makes the offenders safe to join society again, but also makes them "flourish-
ing, happy, and self-actualizing members .... Id.
205. Although one can certainly counsel her not to have any additional children.
206. The drug azidothymidine, commonly known as AZT is currently available as a
treatment which prolongs the life of an AIDS patient, but it is not a cure.
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have any more children.207 However, this limited goal could be
achieved outside the prison setting, at a lower cost to the State and
the woman's freedom.
Another goal of punishment, general deterrence, seeks to punish
some offenders in order to deter others from committing the same
crime.20 8 Under this justification, the result of imprisoning a wo-
man for transmitting the virus to her child would be to deter wo-
men from conceiving, or from engaging in sexual intercourse
altogether, this was clearly the intent of the statute, given its express
language. However, there is no guarantee that this would deter
other women at all.209 In the case of drug-addicted mothers, prose-
cutions don't frighten women into abstaining from drug use.21 0
Furthermore, given the personal, cultural, social, economic and
religious considerations of any individual woman, she may choose
motherhood at all costs, thereby frustrating the general deterrent
value of imprisoning another HIV-infected woman.211
"Specific" or "special" deterrence is a separate goal of the crimi-
nal justice system. This theory advocates that if one prosecutes a
criminal for a culpable act, the pain of punishment will deter this
specific individual from committing the same crime again. As ap-
plied to perinatal transmission, prosecutions, possibly leading to a
jail term, may deter the woman from having additional children.
She would also be encouraged to have an abortion to avoid jail.2 12
Even though this theory might achieve limited success, it is almost a
207. Logically, even if the woman could be convinced to abstain from having any more
children, this is not reformation. This is merely "education." According to the NEW CEN-
TURY DICTIONARY 1503 (1953), to "reform" is to "cause (a person) to abandon wrong
or evil ways of life or conduct, and to adopt right ones; bring about amendment in (a person,
or his manner of life, conduct, etc.).. ." By convincing a woman not to have any more
children, she is not abandoning "wrong or evil ways," nor is she amending her status as a
victim of AIDS.
208. SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
PROCESSES (5th ed. 1989). Our present criminal justice system subscribes to this goal of
punishment. However, Immanuel Kant argued against this goal by stating that "men should
never be treated merely as a means to an end." Franklin Zimring & Gordon Hawkins, Deter-
rence: The Legal Threat in Crime Control, 35-37 (1973) (quoting Immanuel Kant).
209. Paltrow, supra note 196, at 44. "In reality, prosecutions and convictions deter preg-
nant women from getting what little health care is available." Id.
210. Id. (stating "[i]f prosecutions actually frightened women into going cold turkey (and
they don't), abrupt withdrawal from certain drugs, such as heroin, could cause fetal death").
211. See supra notes 176-78 discussing harm to women.
212. Rachel H. Nicholson, No (Pregnant) Woman is an Island: The Case For a Carefully
Delimited Use of Criminal Sanctions to Enforce Gestational Responsibility, 1 HEALTH MA-
TRIX 101, 107 n. 28 (stating "[w]hat the right to lifers don't realize ... there are going to be
more late abortions as women decide they don't want to go to jail").
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moot goal since most of these HIV-infected mothers will not have
the strength, nor the longevity, to bear any more children.
The third goal of criminal justice is incapacitation, or isolation.
By incapacitating a criminal, we seek to reduce crime by taking the
individual out of the workings of society. Perhaps this is the only
viable reason to prosecute a woman for transmitting the virus to her
child. If she is isolated, she, generally speaking, cannot conceive
again. But isolation should be limited to extricating from society
those dangerous people that cannot handle the responsibility of be-
ing HIV-positive, who intentionally infect as many people as they
can find, or who continue to have unprotected sex without inform-
ing their partners.21 3 Even by incarceration, one cannot separate a
mother from her fetus so that she won't continue to infect. This is a
biological impossibility.
The final justification for punishment is retribution. The defini-
tion of retributivism is as follows:
Retributivism... is the view that punishment is justified by the
desert of the offender. The good that is achieved by punishing, in
this view, has nothing to do with future states of affairs, such as
the prevention of crime or the maintenance of social cohesion.
Rather, the good that punishment achieves is that someone who
deserves it gets it.
2 14
By applying this theory to perinatal transmission, the State would
be claiming retribution against the mother on behalf of the child,
for giving the child life. This argument seems to mirror that of the
"wrongful life doctrine," '215 which cannot logically claim much sup-
port in light of the statistics regarding the actual transmission
rate.216
Ultimately, not one of the four purposes of punishment strongly
justifies prosecuting a woman for transmitting the HIV virus to her
unborn child. The practical results of imprisoning these women are
the overcrowded prisons, the draining of the State's resources for
213. Katherine Bishop, Prostitute in Jail After AIDS Report, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 1990,
at § 1 p. 12. A police officer arrested a prostitute and charged her with attempted murder for
continuing to solicit customers after appearing in a Newsweek article which reported that she
continued working despite being infected with the AIDS virus. The arresting officer is re-
ported as saying, "I don't know if she had the formulated intent to spread the disease...
[t]he matter is in the courts now. But armed with this knowledge, if you continue to do this,
it's like saying, 'What the heck, I'm going to die anyway.' ... The sergeant said prostitutes
infected with the virus should be removed from the streets and placed in isolation as "some
form of control for those who cannot or will not control themselves." Id.
214. MICHAEL MOORE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY 233 (1984).
215. See supra note 37.
216. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
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legal proceedings and maintenance, the possible denial of a seriously
ill individual adequate health care, and the separation of a mother
from her children. On balance, there is no compelling argument to
justify imprisonment.
VI. SOLUTIONS
The constitutional and policy interests that these statutes con-
front illustrate that criminalizing perinatal transmission will not
protect the public health interest, nor will it significantly decrease
the number of HIV-infected persons. Furthermore, it will invade a
woman's reproductive freedom, will violate her constitutional right
to the equal protection of the law, as well as the right to be free
from cruel or unusual punishment, and will collide with well-estab-
lished public policies supporting procreation and childbirth.
Using the penal system to confront the problem of pediatric
AIDS is not the only solution available. This note will not suggest
an alternative approach. The first step that must be taken to clean
up the problems inherent in these statutes is the redrafting of the
involved legislation. The language must be more specific, must clar-
ify the legislative intent, and must add either an affirmative defense
or an exclusion for perinatal transmission. To constructively com-
bat the growing problem of pediatric AIDS, all prospective mothers
should be educated, counseled and offered HIV testing in such facil-
ities as hospitals, clinic prenatal care units, schools, and community
shelters. Finally, federal and state funding of prenatal care clinics
and drug rehabilitation programs, servicing both pregnant and non-
pregnant women, should be increased.
A. Redrafting
The definitions of such language as "sexual," "intimate con-
tact," and "parenteral transmission" must be clearly stated. In
Michigan, the statute defines the culpable conduct as "sexual pene-
tration," which is further defined as "sexual intercourse, cunnilin-
gus, fellatio, anal intercourse, or any other intrusion, however
slight, of any part of a person's body or of any object into the geni-
tal or anal openings of another persons' body, but emission of semen
is not required." '217 In considering the policy and constitutional ar-
217. Whether the listed conduct creates a grave and unjustifiable risk of transmitting the
virus is for a health organization to determine, and accordingly they should be consulted on
this matter. It would be beyond the scope of this note to discuss whether all of these forms of
contact created a risk. However, the explicit nature of the language of this state serves as a
good example of the detail needed to clarify the HIV-statutes.
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guments against penalizing women for perinatal transmission, the
statutes should be redrafted, like that of Michigan, to limit the cul-
pable conduct to sexual acts or the donation of blood. If the stat-
utes were drafted more explicitly, there would be less danger of
expanding the scope of coverage to perinatal transmission.2" '
An alternative to redrafting the language would be to add an
affirmative defense or exclusion for perinatal transmission. The lan-
guage could read, "it shall be an affirmative defense that the infec-
tion or risk of infection occurred in a perinatal relationship," or "an
infection or risk of infection created in the prenatal environment
shall be excluded from prosecution under this statute." Amending
the statute to include an affirmative defense may still leave room for
an arrest and confinement until the litigation commenced. How-
ever, an explicit exclusion would effectively preclude arrest, confine-
ment and prosecution, and the woman would be free to spend her
time and money for services, counseling and prenatal care.
B. Education
Most scholars and public policy analysts suggest that imprison-
ing drug-addicted mothers serves no purpose but to separate a
mother from her child because of her addiction, and to leave the
child to be cared for by the State or foster homes. In addition,
drugs are almost always available, even in prison. Furthermore,
there are very few drug treatment programs that will accept preg-
nant women or that will provide day care for in-patient care.219
The basic problem is the lack of access to drug treatment programs
for pregnant women. Many argue we should take the money spent
on reporting and prosecuting drug-abusive mothers, and spend that
money on increasing drug treatment programs.22
218. However, there is still a chance that a zealous prosecutor will bring a case before a
court to argue that the scope of the statute should be expanded to include perinatal transmis-
sion. Without an explicit affirmative defense (see discussion below), a judge could expand the
scope, liberally construing legislative intent.
219. Arras, supra note 37, at 359 (stating that "[clearly, our society must be condemned
for failing to provide HIV-infected women with decent and human medical services and more
equitable social opportunities").
220. "Real solutions would include making available reproductive health services, includ-
ing abortion, sex and parenting education, and prenatal and other health care. Non-discrimi-
nation policies must be adopted and enforced in existing drug treatment programs and more
funds, including the money which is presently being used to arrest women and place their
children in foster care, must be made available for drug treatment and education. And fi-
nally, prosecutors and lawmakers must stop pretending that the criminal prosecution of preg-
nant women is a quick fix for the problems of drug addictions when we have known for years
that drug abuse, like most other causes of infant mortality and morbidity, requires long-term
[Vol. 3:495
1993] THE CRIMINALIZATION OF PERINATAL AIDS TRANSMISSION 535
The concern with rehabilitation and education for drug-ad-
dicted mothers is certainly well-founded, since after treatment, they
can be funneled back into the mainstream and can be made into
productive and effective parents. Some would argue that this opti-
mistic result cannot be analogized to the AIDS case. We can treat
the disease, but we can't cure it. However, drugs and AIDS go
hand-in-hand.221 If we can educate and reform present drug-abus-
ing women, we can possibly avoid the birth of an HIV-positive child
in the future.
Focusing on drug-abuse programs is only the first step to curb-
ing the spread of HIV to children. We must also institute meaning-
ful education about sexuality and reproduction, starting in
elementary school. These programs must strive to make the risk of
AIDS real and lethal and must stress that prevention is possible and
necessary. We must teach those adults who are at risk how to pre-
vent contraction of the virus; and we must teach those who are al-
ready infected how to prevent transmission of the virus. Specifically
applied to women of child-bearing years, it is the right of an in-
fected or at-risk woman to obtain unbiased, factual and up-to-date
information about birth control, safe sex techniques, pregnancy,
and the outcome of pregnancy for herself and her child, as well as to
have full access to supportive perinatal, pediatric and abortion serv-ices.222 This education must also be available to non-infected wo-
men, and women who have not identified themselves as being in an
"at-risk" category. Ideally, sensitive, informed counselors should
be available in inner-city, suburban and rural hospitals, in clinic
prenatal care units which are separate from full service hospitals, in
high schools and colleges, and in community shelters.
In addition to education and counseling, confidential HIV test-
ing should be offered to all women of childbearing age, especially
solutions involving significant societal commitments to rehabilitation, treatment, and educa-
tion." Paltrow, supra note 196, at 46.
221. According to a Centers for Disease Control update, intravenous drug use was the
most common risk factor. Forty-two percent of the 136,204 AIDS cases reported to the CDC
from 1981 to April 1990 were black or Hispanic, and 52% of those cases were contracted
through intravenous drug use. In addition, the next most common risk factor was having a
sex partner with a history of drug use. Out of the same 42%, 18% fell into this category.
222. One author who spends a considerable amount of time discussing counseling for
HIV-infected women emphasizes the reality of indifference and animosity found in this type
of counseling. Levine & Dubler, supra note 80. This might be an even greater problem if the
HIV-specific statutes are not redrafted to exclude pregnant women. The "counseling" might
turn into a coerced abortion, merely to set the woman free from prosecution. Unfortunately,
this "advice" would be in lieu of providing the woman with information about the risks of
reproduction and prenatal care services.
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after an interview by a trained health care professional identifies
influential risk factors.223 This testing should be accompanied by
counseling, informed consent and appropriate provisions for pri-
vacy and confidentiality. Testing will serve two purposes: 1) it will
aid health professionals in determining the current prevalence of the
virus in the pediatric and female population, and 2) it will help a
woman make the difficult decision whether she wishes to continue a
pregnancy, terminate a pregnancy, or try to conceive.
Finally, in trying to reform the national health care system, fed-
eral and state governments, as well as private insurance companies,
should increase the funding of prenatal care clinics and drug reha-
bilitation programs which service both pregnant and non-pregnant
women.224 Education, counseling and testing cannot be adminis-
tered if there are no forums or funds. As mentioned earlier, a sub-
stantial percentage of women contract the HIV virus from
intravenous drug use, either before or during pregnancy. The wait-
ing lists for drug rehabilitation programs are long, and there are
very few programs that are equipped to deal with adult/fetal with-
drawal. If the number of programs was increased, and the curricu-
lum was redesigned to cope with the special needs of pregnant
women, perhaps the pediatric infection rate could be reduced.
VI. CONCLUSION
The growing number of HIV-infected women will result in a
parallel pediatric trend. There is no question that a strong prevent-
ative and educational policy must be implemented to avoid creating
a new class of infected individuals. The HIV-specific transmission
criminalization statutes should not be included in the solution to
this problem. Application of these statutes to a pregnant, HIV-in-
fected woman tramples on this individual's fundamental right to
privacy and bodily autonomy, and on her right to equal protection
of the laws. Furthermore, the application of these statutes intrudes
upon the rights of all women to procreate, to have sexual inter-
course and to be free from mandated abortion or sterilization.
223. Some of the risk factors include intravenous drug use, having a sex partner with a
history of drug use, having a sex partner who is bisexual or a hemophiliac, having a blood
transfusion, or being born in countries with predominantly heterosexual transmission.
224. Nolan, supra note 37, at 20 (stating that "[s]uch programs may be costly, but per-
haps cost-effective in terms of offsetting the economic burden of maintaining women in prison
and maintaining small neonates in newborn nurseries or in foster care when they do poorly at
birth."). See also Chavkin, Addiction & Pregnancy: Policy Crossroads, 80 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 483 (1990).
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These statutes will have a disproportionate effect on poor women
and women of color or Hispanic origin, ultimately creating one
more barrier to their access to prenatal and contraceptive health
care. Finally, the State will be unable to successfully argue that it
satisfies even one goal of the criminal justice system. Not only is it
biologically impossible to reform an HIV carrier, but incarceration
serves only to isolate a woman from prenatal care and her other
children. The argument that the threat of a prison term will deter
other women from having children is weak, given the fact that it has
not served as a deterrent to drug addicted women. Finally, it of-
fends one's sense of logic and fairness to think that a child could
claim retribution from his mother for giving him life.
Since the solution does not lie in the penal system, the statutes
should be amended and redrafted to specifically exclude perinatal
transmission from punishment, or, at least, to clearly define the con-
duct that is subject to the statute. In addition, we must increase the
amount of and access to reproductive and preventative education.
We should target hospitals, clinic prenatal care units, schools, and
community shelters. In conjunction with sensitive, non-coercive
counseling and education, we must offer confidential HIV testing to
all women of childbearing age. Most importantly, we must increase
access to medical services for all HIV-infected pregnant women,
whether they choose to abort or to continue the pregnancy to term.
Finally, it is suggested that we increase private, state and federal
funding of prenatal care clinics, drug rehabilitation programs which
service all women, and health care coverage.
Asserting a position that does not allow the government,
through criminal statutes, to discourage an HIV-positive woman
from bearing children may be a difficult position to defend. Perhaps
many women, if put in the same tragic situation, would choose not
to bear a child. However, denying these women the legal right to
make a reproductive decision based on the simple fact that they
have a terminal disease, is a much greater "injustice" than bringing
a child into the world.

